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Abstract
We study sequential auctions in which bidders demand multiple units. We collect
a novel data set on sequential water auctions for the empirical study. Although water
units are identical, two features from the empirical setting create a trade-off whereby
units of water end up being complements or substitutes. First, there is a water loss
that is only incurred for the first unit, generating a sunk cost. Second, subsequent units
of water exhibit decreasing marginal returns. Units of water are complements or sub-
stitutes depending on the relative importance of the sunk cost and decreasing returns.
Weather seasonality provides us with the required variation (in sunk costs relative to de-
creasing returns) to perform the empirical investigation. When units are complements,
one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit, thus deterring others
from bidding on subsequent units. When units are substitutes, different bidders win the
units with positive probability and pay prices of similar magnitude, even when the same
bidder wins all units. We analyze this stark pattern of outcomes not investigated in the
literature before. We recover individual demand consistent with this pricing behavior
and confirm it is not collusive, but consistent with non-cooperative behavior. Demand
estimates are biased if one ignores these features.
JEL Codes: D44, C13, L10, L40.
Keywords: Auctions, Structural Demand Estimation, Market Structure, Competition, Col-
lusion.
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1 Introduction
There are many instances in the real world where several units of the same or similar goods are
allocated sequentially or periodically using auctions. Examples include timber, procurement
of public goods, electromagnetic spectrum, and treasury bills. The nature of the goods at
auction and the firms bidding determine whether the goods are complements (increasing
marginal returns or IMR) or substitutes (decreasing marginal returns or DMR). In many
cases, IMR arise because firms incur fixed costs to realize the full value of purchased goods.
This is the case of the machinery and workers needed to fell trees or build highways. Firms
might experience DMR due to limited capacity to hire more workers or buy more machinery.
DMR may also arise as a consequence of the downward sloping demand for the firms’ final
products, e.g., once a firm has a valid spectrum for a given county, the value of another
tranche of the spectrum decreases substantially. Firms would face IMR if the first effect
dominates, DMR if the second effect dominates, and hill shaped marginal returns if both
effects are important.
By affecting the valuation of subsequent units, fixed costs and decreasing returns deter-
mine bidder behavior and price dynamics. Price dynamics are central to connect observed
bids to the underlying distributions that characterize individual demand, which is fundamen-
tal to discuss positive and normative questions. For instance, variation in prices caused by
a high sunk cost will affect even relatively simple tasks such as measuring the dispersion in
individuals’ private valuations. Moreover, in such a case, a competitive environment could
be incorrectly interpreted as collusive.
The existing literature on sequential auctions has provided little empirical evidence on
the effect that complementarities and substitutabilities in the valuation of subsequent units
have on price behavior within the same market. The main reason for this lack of evidence is
the challenge of finding sufficient variation in the degree of complementarity within the same
market. Our aim is to address this empirical gap. To that end, we examine a unique panel
data set from sequential water auctions from a self-governed community of farmers in Mula,
Spain.1 Admittedly, few industrial organization economists will find water auctions from
farmers in southeastern Spain interesting per se. We study this empirical setting because it
allows us to exploit a unique scenario where a market exhibits periodic switches or reversions
between regimes of complementarity and substitutability, i.e., regimes where identical units
may complement and substitute within the same market and for the same bidder. Weather
conditions in Mula generate large changes in the degree of complementarity across seasons:
variation in the importance of sunk costs relative to decreasing returns as described in section
3. We use this variation to: (1) analyze bidding behavior in sequential auctions in which
buyers’ preferences for multiple units exhibit both sunk costs and DMR, and (2) investigate
its implications for price dynamics and price competition. This empirical setting allows to
1The four main fruit trees grown in the region are oranges, lemons, peaches, and apricots.
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analyze a stark pattern of outcomes not previously documented in the literature. Sometimes,
winning prices exhibit a standard competitive pattern. In this scenario, winning prices are
similar in magnitude, regardless of whether the same or different bidders (farmers in our
case) win the sequential units. Other times, one farmer wins all the units, pays a high price
for the first unit, deters other farmers from entering subsequent auctions, and thus pays a
very low price for the remaining units. We call this the deterrence effect. We show that this
pattern of outcomes is consistent with a non-cooperative equilibrium, where the observed
price dynamics are competitive, not collusive.
The data in this paper come from all water auctions in Mula, Spain, from January 1954
through August 1966—when the last auction was run—and the allocation system switched to
a bargaining system, as described in section 2. The data for our analysis consist of individual
winning bids and auction covariates. These covariates include the amount of rainfall. The
basic unit of sale is the right to use three hours of water (432,000 liters) for irrigation. For
each weekday, eight units are sold for each schedule: four for daytime (7AM-7PM) and four
for nighttime (7PM-7AM) irrigation. The auctioneer sells first the twenty units corresponding
to nighttime and then the twenty units corresponding to daytime. This leaves ten four-units
sets of auctions that are sold in order. (The ten sets of four-units auctions are: Monday-
nighttime, Tuesday-nighttime, and so on, until Friday-daytime.) Thus, the relevant unit
of analysis for investigating individuals’ demand and the pattern of outcomes is four-units
auctions. But units within each four-units set are not conditional-independent due to the
presence of sunk costs. Observing the winner’s identity allows us to estimate the model, as
outlined in section 4. Local weather conditions determine the relevant agricultural irrigation
technology and, hence, water demand. Additionally, as less rain falls in summer than in
winter in southern Spain, the presence of seasonalities provides us with the variation in sunk
costs relative to decreasing returns necessary to perform the empirical investigation.
We incorporate two features from our empirical setting. First, a sunk cost is incurred
for the first unit bought because water flows through a channel dug into the ground. Some
water is lost when the channel is dry (the first unit), but the loss is negligible for subsequent
units. Engineers have estimated that 20% of the water of the first unit that travels through a
dry channel was lost (Gómez-Espín, Gil-Meseguer, and García-Marín 2006, p. 31). Second,
DMR are present for subsequent units because the amount of irrigated land is fixed. We
model the environment as a sequential ascending price English auction along the lines of
von der Fehr (1994) in which bidders, by incurring a participation cost, decide whether to
attend each sale.
The relative importance of sunk costs and DMR generates a trade-off, whereby buyers’
bidding behavior depend on whether different units are complements or substitutes. When
goods are complements, the same bidder wins all the objects paying a high price for the first
unit equal to the valuation for the whole bundle (four times the second highest valuation for
the first unit, adjusted for the complementarity effect and participation cost). By doing this,
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the winner of the first unit deters others from bidding on the remaining three units, allowing
this bidder to pay very low prices (close to zero) for the remaining three units. The resulting
price pattern, along with the same bidder winning all the units, may lead to an incorrect
collusive interpretation. When goods are substitutes, different bidders win the objects with a
positive probability and pay prices of similar magnitude, even when the same bidder wins all
the objects. We provide empirical evidence for the key features of our model: participation
and sunk costs.
The price patterns predicted by the model provide a straightforward method to determine
the regime—complements or substitutes—being played. When goods are complements, very
low prices are paid by the same winner (the winner of the first unit) for the second, third,
and fourth units; thus, the difference between the price paid for the first and the remaining
units is large. When goods are substitutes, the units might be bought by different bidders
and the prices of all four units are similar; thus, the difference between the price paid for the
first and the remaining units is negligible. This allows to determine the regime by looking at:
(1) the identities of the winner (i.e. whether the same bidder bought all the four units), and
(2) the difference between the price paid for the first and the remaining units (see section 4).
We estimate the distribution of private valuations by maximum likelihood using an ex-
ponential distribution and the English structure for the auction. To estimate sunk cost and
DMR, we form moment conditions based on the structural equations of the model. We infer
participation costs using data from auctions in which bidders were present, but no one placed
bids. This method gives us bounds on participation costs.
Our empirical work establishes three main results. First, we recover individual de-
mand—characterized by private valuations and the model’s structural parameters—that is
consistent with the described price patterns and the deterrence effect in particular. Second,
the equilibrium price dynamics are consistent with competitive behavior. Non-cooperative
behavior is not only consistent with the deterrence effect, but also predicts such price dif-
ferentials. Incentives to deviate from a collusive strategy are higher in spring and summer,
when water is more valuable. However, it is in spring and summer when we observe non-
cooperative behavior more often. Finally, we show that estimates that ignore the importance
of participation and sunk costs will be biased. We test whether price variations, conditional
on covariates, are better explained by our proposed model or a standard English auction
model without participation costs, using that the latter is encompassed by the former. The
approach of Haile and Tamer (2003), that relies on two basic behavioral assumptions, provides
a robust structural framework for inference. These minimal assumptions are not satisfied in
the present context. We discuss how Haile and Tamer’s structure can be interpreted in the
current setting.
Section 2 discusses the auction system, the empirical regularities, and the modeling as-
sumptions required in our context. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 examines the
estimation procedure. Section 5 presents the results, analyzes the importance of sunk costs,
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and the interpretation of complementarities. Section 6 concludes.
Contributions and Related Literature
We now describe the related literature and highlight how our paper contributes to the current
body of work. This paper is closest to the empirical literature on sequential auctions with
multi-unit demand. To the best of our knowledge, the price dynamics that we investigate
(see section 2) have not been documented in the literature before. Most of the literature
do not consider participation costs in their analysis. We show how participation costs affect
equilibrium outcomes. We then use our model to partially identify participation costs and
estimate informative bounds.
Numerous empirical studies have highlighted the importance of complementarities (Anton
and Yao 1987; Gandal 1997; Wolfram 1998; Pesendorfer 2000; Marshall, Raiff, Richard, and
Schulenberg 2006).2 Substitutabilities are a major component in several industries such as
sequential highway construction procurement auctions (Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2003),
sequential timber auctions (List, Millimet, and Price 2004), or sequential cattle auctions
(Zulehner 2009). Several authors have studied cases of either complements due to synergies
among auctioned goods, or substitutes due to decreasing marginal utility (Black and De Meza
1992; Branco 1997; Liu 2011). Selling goods in a bundle increases a seller’s revenue when
goods are complements (Palfrey 1983; Levin 1997, Armstrong 2000). Our setting differs from
these scenarios in that we consider sequential, instead of simultaneous, auctions.3
Prior investigations of the relationship between sequential auctions and the complementar-
ity or substitutability between identical units are more scarce (e.g. Jeitschko and Wolfstetter
2002; Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2012). Jeitschko and Wolfstetter 2002 analyze optimal
sequential auctions in a binary-valuations case. They find that English auctions extract more
rent than first-price auctions. Our model differs as we consider the class of continuous val-
uation distributions. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2012) allow for complementarities and
substitutabilities in a model of sequential auctions. They find that while first-price auctions
give greater revenue than second-price (English) auctions when the goods are substitutes,
the opposite is true for complements. Both mechanisms are efficient in their model. Their
predictions about price trends are consistent with previous findings. Contrary to our analysis
with participation costs, where buyers are better informed than the seller, Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer (2012) examine the effect of capacity constraints on bidding behavior in procure-
ment auctions using a two-period auction game where sellers have private information about
their costs. Balat (2013) and Groeger (2014) analyze dynamic auctions in the highway pro-
2Outside the auction literature, Gentzkow (2007) studies the value of new goods using a model encom-
passing the possibility of both complementarities and substitutabilities.
3See Milgrom (2000) and Ausubel (2004) for recent contributions to this literature. Edelman, Ostrovsky,
and Schwarz (2007) study the properties of a “generalized English auction” used to sell Internet advertisements
and show their proposed mechanism has a unique equilibrium. Kagel and Levin (2005) experimentally
investigate multi-unit demand auctions with synergies, and compare behavior in sealed-bid and ascending-
bid uniform-price auctions. See Kagel (1995) for a survey on laboratory experimental auction markets.
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curement market. Balat (2013) extends the model from Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2012)
by allowing endogenous participation and unobserved heterogeneity. Groeger (2014) analyzes
bidder learning in the entry stage of an auction game.4 Finally, Hendricks and Porter (1988)
conducted an early and influential investigation on how interdependencies among auctioned
objects affect the auction’s outcome. They analyze auctions for drainage leases and show that
better informed firms (which hold tracts neighboring the drainage tracts that were auctioned)
earned higher rents than uninformed ones.
This paper makes a methodological contribution by developing an empirical model of
sequential English auctions with participation costs that allows units to complement and
substitute for the same bidder depending on seasonalities. The model produces distinguish-
able price pattern predictions in each regime. This feature allows us to determine the regime
under which the game is being played using the ratio between prices in different auctions.
This allows us to weaken the behavioral assumptions, such as the specification of bidders’
beliefs, that would be necessary to solve the whole game (see section 3). Similar to the work
of Hendricks and Porter (1988) and Haile (2001), we show evidence inconsistent with the
equilibrium predictions of standard models and supportive of a model that captures sunk
costs, decreasing marginal returns, and participation costs. Not accounting for these features
may lead to the incorrect interpretation of a competitive market as collusive.
We build upon the existing literature on participation costs and entry fees (McAfee and
McMillan 1987; Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1993; von der Fehr 1994) by constructing a sequential
English auction model similar to that of von der Fehr (1994). However, our set-up differs
in that bidders are allowed to buy more than one unit of the good. von der Fehr (1994)
considers the case when goods are independent and finds the same equilibrium as that of our
complementarities case.
While the auction literature has studied price dynamics and the relationship between
sequentially auctioned goods (e.g. Weber 1983; McAfee and Vincent 1993; Benhardt and
Scoones 1994; Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1994), to the best of our knowledge, we analyze a stark
pattern of outcomes not investigated in the literature before. Sometimes, when goods are
substitutes, winning prices exhibit a standard competitive pattern: regardless of whether the
same or different bidders win the sequential units, winning prices are similar in magnitude.
Other times, when goods are complements, the same bidder wins all units by paying a high
price for the first unit, deterring others from bidding on subsequent units.5 We show that this
pattern of outcomes is consistent with a competitive market structure. We are not aware of
any study where identical units may complement and substitute within the same market and
4In contrast, we investigate a stark price dynamics not documented before (see section 2). In our empirical
setting, the same identical units sometimes complement and other times substitute for the same bidder. We
show that these price dynamics are not collusive, but consistent with non-cooperative behavior. In addition,
we infer participation based on two simple assumptions that provide us informative bounds.
5Declining or downward price trends in sequential auctions, the results we describe in subsection 2.4, have
been broadly documented (e.g. Ashenfelter 1989; Ashenfelter and Genesove 1992; McAfee and Vincent 1993).
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for the same bidder.6 In addition to recovering the structural parameters that characterize
individual demand and confirming it is consistent with non-cooperative behavior, which are
of interest to the literature on empirical auctions, we collect a unique panel data set to
examine a market institution that was active and stable for eight centuries in a self-governed
community of farmers in southern Spain.7 Understanding this strategic non-cooperative
behavior of bidders in this stable market institution is of independent interest.
2 Background and Data
The data in this paper come from all water auctions in Mula, Spain, from January 1954
through August 1966, when the last auction was run.8 On August 1st, 1966, the allocation
system was modified from an auction to a two-sided bargaining system. In the bargain-
ing system, the Heredamiento de Aguas (water-owners holding) and Sindicato de Regantes
(land-owners association) arranged a fixed price for every cuarta of water (the smallest unit
auctioned). Gradually, the Sindicato de Regantes bought shares in the Heredamiento de
Aguas association until they finally merged in 1974. Thereafter, water was allocated to each
farmer following a fixed quota with each piece of land entitled to some proportion of the
water every year.9
The reasons for focusing on the period from 1954 to 1966 are, first, that it represents the
final period of the auction allocating system in use for at least eight centuries in this region.
Second, the government conducted a special agricultural census in 1954/55, providing detailed
information about the farmers who bid in this period’s auctions
The study of these sequential auctions introduces a unique circumstance for analyzing a
stark pattern of outcomes not previously documented in the literature. Sometimes, winning
prices exhibit a standard competitive pattern where, regardless of whether the same or dif-
ferent farmers win the sequential units, prices are similar in magnitude (Panel A in Figure
1). Other times, one farmer wins all sequential units: he pays a high price for the first unit,
6The literature in multi-unit auctions can be divided into sequential auctions, in which the auctioneer
sells the units following a series of sequential steps using a single-unit auction each time, and simultaneous
auctions, in which the auctioneer uses a complex mechanism to allocate all units simultaneously. For recent
contributions see Kastl (2011), who investigates bidders submitting step functions as their bids in multi-
unit treasury bills auctions, and Reguant (2013), who studies complementarity bidding mechanisms used in
wholesale electricity auctions. Implementing a simultaneous auction requires a strong commitment from the
auctioneer either to not renege in the promised mechanism, or to use the information elicited in the process
to demand a higher price for the good. This also imposes technical difficulties in the way bidders frame their
contingent bids (Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg 2006). Neither of these conditions are satisfied in our
setting. Hortaçsu (2011) discusses recent progress in the empirical study of multi-units auctions. See Kagel
and Levin (2001) for an experimental investigation when bidders demand multiple units in sealed bid and
ascending auctions.
7In the lead article of the first issue of the American Economic Review, Coman (1911) provides an early
discussion of the same institution that is analyzed in detail in this paper. For an extensive study of self-
governed irrigation communities see Ostrom (1992).
8Data available in the historical archive of Mula go back to 1803.
9Donna and Espin-Sanchez (2016) shows that this institutional change—from auctions to quotas—was
welfare improving in Mula.
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deterring other farmers from entering subsequent auctions, thus paying a very low price for
the remaining units (Panel B in Figure 1).10 This stark pattern of outcomes is consistent
across the whole sample (see Table 1 and Figure 3 that we describe in subsection 2.4).
2.1 Water Auctions as an Allocation System
Although the process of allocating water in Mula has varied slightly over time, the basic
structure has essentially remained unchanged since the 15th century. Land in Mula is divided
into regadío (irrigated land) and secano (dry land). Irrigation is only permitted in the former.
A channel system directs water from the river to regadío lands.11 Regadío are fertile lands
close to rivers, and thus allow a more efficient use of the water in the region. Since it is
forbidden to irrigate lands categorized as secano, only the farmers that own a piece of regadío
land in Mula are allowed to buy water.
The mechanism to allocate water to those farmers was a sequential outcry ascending
price (or English) auction. The auctioneer sold by auction each of the units sequentially and
independently of each other. The auctioneer tracked the name of the buyer of every unit and
the price paid by the winner.12
The basic selling unit is a cuarta (quarter), which is the right to use water that flows
through the main channel for three hours. Water storage is done in the De La Cierva dam.
Water flows from the dam through the channels at approximately 40 liters per second. As a
result, one cuarta carries approximately 432,000 liters of water. Traditionally, auctions were
held every 21 days to complete a tanda (quota), the basic aggregate unit of irrigation time.
During our sample period, auctions were carried out every Friday.
During each session, 40 cuartas were auctioned: four cuartas for irrigation during the day
(from 7:00 AM to 7:00 PM) and four cuartas for irrigation during the night (from 7:00 PM
to 7:00 AM), for each weekday (Monday to Friday). The auctioneer first sold the 20 cuartas
corresponding to the night-time, and then the 20 cuartas corresponding to the day-time.
Within each day and night group, units were sold beginning with Monday’s four cuartas,
and finishing with Friday’s.
10In terms of purchasing power, one peseta from 1950 is approximately equivalent to 0.43 U.S. dollars from
2013 (for details see section A in the online appendix).
11The channel system was expanded from the 13th to 15th century as a response to the greater demand for
land due to population increase. The regadío land structure has not changed since the 15th century.
12The farmers could not store water in their plots. Reselling water was forbidden. While a farmer could
steal water by opening the gate next to his own parcel, the technology for detection of this crime was effective
as irrigation was done by flood irrigation (more on this in subsection 2.2). It was easy to determine who
stole water just by identifying a flooded parcel from a farmer who did not buy water in the auction for that
specific day-schedule (conditional on rainfall). The Tribunal de los Hombres Buenos (Council of Good Men),
composed by elected members among the farmer community, was responsible to adjudicate conflicts between
the farmers. Conflicts mostly arose over unpermitted irrigation. We investigate this behavior in Donna and
Espin-Sanchez (2015).
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2.2 Unit of Analysis
The most comprehensive independent unit of analysis that could be considered is the weekly
auctions, encompassing all 40 units sold per week. This would be the relevant definition
to answer questions related to demand fluctuations generated by supply shocks, such as no
auctions due to drought or excessive rain, on an aggregate level. Alternatively, the narrowest
possible unit purchased is a cuarta (1 of the 40 weekly units). As discussed below , the
presence of SC and DMR indicate that cuartas within a day-schedule are not conditional-
independent. Moreover, they are not the relevant unit of analysis to investigate individual
farmers’ demand, nor the price pattern described below.
Our original question is motivated by the price behavior caused by the deterrence effect.
This particular behavior is observed within four-units auctions and is the relevant unit of
analysis in the model. This is an implication of the way the auction is structured: twelve
hours of water (subdivided into four cuartas of three hours each) during day-time and twelve
hours of water during night-time, each weekday. The logic behind this structure is related to
water requirements in the area.
First, water scarcity in the region made water accountability crucial. The standard unit
used to measure surface area in Mula is called tahúlla. One tahúlla is, by definition, the
surface area which can be irrigated in such a way that water level rises 1-foot high in 1
minute.13 The surface area from one-tahúlla varies from one town to another, depending on
soil conditions.14 A four-consecutive units auction—half day, twelve hours of irrigation—is,
in that sense, the amount of water that absorbed by a regular parcela (individual piece of
land). Water requirements could and actually do differ (a) across farmers depending on
farming trees and land extension, and (b) for the same farmer over time depending on past
rainfall.
Second, the irrigation technique used in Mula is flood irrigation. The farmer builds small
embankments in his parcela and water is delivered to the land by the channel system that
simply flows over the ground through the crop. Flood irrigation requires a minimum of water
delivery that, for a regular parcela, is captured by one tahúlla.
Finally, a supply-side consideration also plays a role. The reason to supply water for 12
hours (during day-time and during night-time) is to guarantee a particular and homogenous
quantity for each cuarta (which depends on water pressure since water units are defined in
hours). Given that the De La Cierva dam is continuously filled with water from the river,
spreading the supply provision across weekdays ensures the homogeneity of water units.
Our data confirm these three points, validating the relevant unit of analysis for individual
13Although close in magnitude, the traditional Murcian measure of foot is not exactly the same as the foot
measure used in the U.K. and the U.S. (Valiente 2001).
14The surface area of 1-tahúlla is 1,118 square meters in Murcia and 1,185 square meters in the old Kingdom
of Aragón, except the region of Pías Fundaciones. The tahúlla has been used in regadío lands since the reign
of Charles IV (king of Spain from 14 December 1788 until his abdication on 19 March 1808). In secano lands
the surface area measure used is the fanega and the celemín. For further details see Vera Nicolás (2004).
8
demand as four-consecutive units. The most frequent quantity purchased by farmers is
twelve hours of water (42% of sold units are 4CU). There are no observations where the same
farmer buys more than four consecutive units, nor observations where the same farmer buys
consecutive units across days (e.g. there are no observations where the same farmer buys the
last units of a day-auction, and the first units of the night-auction).
2.3 The Dataset
We combine data from four sources. The first is auction data, that we collected from the
historical archive of Mula.15 Based on bidding behavior and water availability, auction data
can be divided into three categories: (i) Regular periods, when the name of the winner, price
paid, date and time of the irrigation for each auction transaction was registered; (ii) No-supply
periods, when no auctions were conducted due to water shortage in the river or damage to
the dam or channels, usually due to intense rain; and finally (iii) No-demand periods, when
auctions were held but no one bid, leaving the registration auction sheet blank. The sample
for this study includes nearly 13 years of auction data spanning January 1954 to August
1966. Every week, 40 units (corresponding to 40 cuartas) were sold, with the exceptions
being when no auction was run (no-supply) or no bids were observed (no-demand). A total
of 17,195 auctions were run during the period under analysis.16
We link auction data to the data that we collected from the 1954/55 agricultural census
from Spain, which provides information on individual characteristics of farmers’ land.17 The
census was conducted by the Spanish government to enumerate all cultivated soil, production
crops, and agricultural assets available in the country. Individual characteristics for the
farmers’ land (potential bidders which we link with the names in the auctions data) include
the type of land and location, area, number of trees, production, and the price at which
this production was sold in the census year. During the 13-year period under analysis, there
were approximately 500 different bidders in our sample. The number of bidders who won
auctions during a specific year was considerably lower—the mean for our sample is around
8 (see table 3, discussed in subsection 4.2)—and conditional on participation, each farmer
won on average 22 units per year. This is consistent with the census data, where mean land
extension is 5.5 ha. with an average of 33 trees per ha.18
15From the section Heredamiento de Aguas, boxes No.: HA 167, HA 168, HA 169, and HA 170.
16Table A1 in the online appendix displays the frequency distribution of units in the auctions disaggregated
by the units bought sequentially by the same farmer.
17From the section Heredamiento de Aguas in the historical archive of Mula, box No. 1,210.
18Average annual rainfall during the period is 320 mm. Recent irrigation studies on young citrus plantings
have shown a water use of 2-5 megalitres per hectare annually (Chott and Bradley 1997). Water savings
are possible if irrigation can be allocated to similar units of production, such as young trees or reworked
sections of a property. In arid regions, like Murcia, water requirements are around 20% less and they are
lower for mature trees. Some farmers that are part of water-owner holding use their own water instead of
selling it through auctions. Although water stress during droughts affects the quality of production, trees
would hardly die as a result. During a normal year without drought, trees could survive the whole year from
rainfall alone. For further details see, e.g., Chott and Bradley (1997), Wright (2000), and du Preez (2001).
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We also link auction data to daily rainfall data for Mula and monthly price indices for
Spain, which we obtain from the Agencia Estatal de Metereología, AEMET (the National Me-
teorological Agency), and the Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, INE (the National
Statistics Institute of Spain), respectively.
2.4 Preliminary Analysis
Mediterranean climate rainfall occurs mainly in spring and autumn. Peak water requirements
for the products cultivated in the region are reached in spring and summer, between April
and August. Soaring demand is reflected by the frequency of auctions where the same farmer
buys all four consecutive units (4CU), which reaches its peak during these months (see Figure
9 and the discussion in subsection 5.3). The frequency of 4CU is not homogenous over time,
but is related to seasonal rainfall, as can be seen in Figure 2. Overall, 42% of the units
were sold in 4CU.19 There are no observations where the same farmer buys more than four
consecutive units, nor observations where the same farmer buys consecutive units across days
(e.g. there are no observations where the same farmer buys the last units of a day-auction,
and the first units of the night-auction).
We only observe the transaction price (winning bid) and the identity of the winner (name).
(We do not observe all bids.) There is substantial price variation, both within and across
four-units auctions. Winning prices range from 0.05 pesetas (ptas) to 4,830 ptas, with a mean
of 271.6 ptas. As expected, winning prices and the frequency distribution of 4CU are strongly
correlated with past rainfall (Figure 2). Table 1 exhibits the distribution of winning prices
by both the number of consecutive units bought by the same individual (1CU, 2CU, 3CU,
or 4CU) and by sequential auction (first, second, third, or fourth). The greater variation
that we observe for 4CU (with respect to non-4CU) has a well defined pattern. While mean
prices for the first auction in 4CU are considerably higher than for non-4CU (Table 1, Panel
2: 677.6 ptas for 4CU against 211.1 ptas for 1CU, 305 ptas for 2CU, or 410 ptas for 3CU),
mean prices for fourth auctions in 4CU are the smallest (Table 1, Panel 5: 210.1 ptas for
4CU against 233.4 ptas for 1CU, 239.6 ptas for 2CU, or 311.6 ptas for 3CU). Median and
maximum prices display similar patterns.
Figure 3 presents price variation by number of consecutive auctions won by the same
individual (left panel) and by sequential auction (right panel). The figure shows that the
stark pattern of outcomes from Panels A and B in Figure 1 is consistent across the whole
sample. On the one hand, in the top panel of 3 we can see that price dispersion—as well
as the mean and median price—is higher when the same farmer wins all four consecutive
units (in the top panel, last vertical box labeled 4). On the other hand, in the bottom panel,
Finally, note that although the average number of trees per farmer is 161 (see Table A2 in subsection A in
the online appendix), the average number of trees per hectare in our sample is 33, a lower number compared
to the conventional agricultural standard spacing for citrus trees that is 100 trees per hectare.
19Table A1 in section A in the online appendix displays the frequency distribution of units sold by number
of units bought by the same farmer.
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where we further disaggregate each box from the top panel by unit (first unit, second unit,
third unit, and fourth unit), we can see that the higher price dispersion for unit 4 in the
top panel—as well as the higher mean and median—is generated by the greater variation in
prices for first units in the lower panel (not by prices in second, third, and fourth units).
This particular pattern in prices is caused by the above mentioned deterrence effect
whereby farmers exhibit different behavior based on seasonality and rainfall, i.e., residual
demand for water. During high demand and low rainfall months, the same farmer buys
all four sequential units, paying a high price for the first unit (with respect to the median
or average price conditional on rain) and very low prices for the remaining units. During
months when demand is not high due to farming seasonalities or when rainfall is high, win-
ning prices for all units are similar in magnitude, regardless of whether the same farmer wins
all sequential units (4CU) or different farmers win subsequent units (1CU, 2CU or 3CU).
Aggregate prices over time display consistent trends with the ones found in the empirical
literature on sequential auctions. Figure 4 shows that, on average, per unit prices decline by
sequential unit (being the first unit of each day higher than second to fourth units), and by
day of the week (prices decline from Monday to Friday). Figure 4 also shows that per unit
prices are slightly higher during the day than during the night. High water requirements for
citrus during summer causes prices to soar during those months (Panel A in Figure 5). As
expected, prices are also higher during droughts, after conditioning on seasons (Figure 5).20
Table 2 shows that these correlations are robust after conditioning on past rain, unit,
weekday, schedule, week-of-the-year, month, and individual fixed effects. The table displays
the results obtained by regressing daily unit prices on a seven-day-rain moving average (Rain
MA7 ), the rain on auction day, and the mentioned fixed effects. The estimated coefficients
on Rain MA7 have the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level. From
column 1, a 10 millimeter (mm) increase in average rain in the previous week is associated
with a decrease of 40.5 ptas in the equilibrium price paid in the auction. The regression in
column 2 adds unit, weekday, and schedule fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on Rain
MA7 increases in magnitude and also has the expected sign. This regression also shows that,
as noticed in previous figures, price declines within day and across units (both for day-time
and night-time auctions) and across schedules (price is on average 110 ptas lower for night-
time auctions than for day-time auctions). The estimated coefficients show that equilibrium
prices decline monotonically within the week (Figure 3). Columns 3 and 4 add, respectively,
month seasonal dummies and individual fixed effects (we have 537 different individuals in
our sample) to the specification in column 2. The estimated coefficient on Rain MA7 in
column 3, though smaller, again has the expected sign and is statistically different from zero.
Similar qualitative results are obtained in column 4; however, the estimated coefficient on
Rain MA7 has increased. Note that the goodness of the fit in the last regression is 36%,
indicating that average (or ex-ante) prices are explained relatively well by observables such
20See the online appendix for a discussion on droughts.
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as rain in the previous week and time of the allocation. This evidence supports the idea the
observable (common knowledge) components of prices in drives four-units auctions. Although
not reported, we performed an analogue analysis using average daily prices within schedule
as a robustness exercise and obtained similar results.
3 The Model
As noted above, bidding behavior is a result of a complex decision process. There are three
main features from the empirical setting that need to be accounted by the model: (i) sunk
costs that farmers incur when they buy their first unit, (ii) decreasing marginal returns of
subsequent units of water, and (iii) participation costs of farmers in this market.
Sunk Costs (SC). Water is allocated during the auction and is distributed on the specific
day and time of the irrigation accordingly. Water stored in the dam is delivered to the
farmer’s plot on this date using the channel system. Except the main canal, all channels are
dug into the ground (Figure 6). On the day of the irrigation, a guard opens the corresponding
gates to allow the water to flow to the appropriate farmer’s land. These channels are land-
specific in the sense that different areas and lands have their own system of channels which
carry water only when the corresponding gates are opened. A concern is that farmers whose
lands lie next to each other may be buying different sequential units for the same auction.
In this case, the SC would only be incurred by the first farmer for his first unit but not for
the second farmer for his first unit. We use data on the specific location of the farmers that
we match to auction winners to analyze these situations in subsection 5.3. There is a water
loss that is incurred because water flows over a dry channel. Engineers have estimated this
loss to be between 15% and 40% (20% on average) of the water carried by one cuarta when
the channel is completely dry (see (Gómez-Espín, Gil-Meseguer, and García-Marín, 2006)).
This is the SC incurred by the bidder for his first unit. The SC is only incurred once, for the
first unit, since water losses associated with a wet channel are negligible. The channel dries
out after approximately 12 hours without water (González-Castaño and Llamas-Ruiz 1991).
In 1974 the system of sub-canals was made of concrete, instead of just dug in the ground, to
prevent such losses (González-Castaño and Llamas-Ruiz 1991).
Decreasing Marginal Returns (DMR). The second feature refers to the decreasing
marginal returns (DMR) effect. The classic textbook case for DMR is appropriate for our
empirical application. Given that the amount of land owned by each farmer is fixed, marginal
productivity of subsequent units of water is decreasing. When assessing the relative impor-
tance of DMR, the impact in summer would generally be greater than in autumn. More
generally, one would expect DMR to be affected by season and rain. When water require-
ments are high, the slope of the marginal productivity function will be relatively flat; this
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is likely to occur in spring and summer. On the other hand, when water requirements are
low, the slope of the marginal productivity function will be steeper; this is likely to happen
in autumn or winter.
Participation Costs. There are several reasons why farmers face participation costs in this
market. The main component of participation costs correspond to the hassle costs associated
with active bidding. Only a fraction of the individuals who attended a Friday auction were
actively engaged in the bidding for a particular sequential auction of water and not everyone
who was present participated in every auction (Botía, Francisco, personal interview, Murcia,
June 17, 2013).21 As von der Fehr (1994) points out, a reasonable assumption for why only
a portion of attendees participate may be that they consider it so unlikely to that they will
win at a price below what they will be willing to pay, that they are not willing to bother to
engage in bidding. We expect this type of costs to be very small but positive.22
Empirical evidence from our data is consistent with the assertion that farmers dislike
participation, facing positive entry costs as they do. We observe multiple weeks per year
when auctions were run, farmers showed up and bought the first units of water, but no one
bid for the last units. Since there was no reservation price and the minimum bid increment
was cents, they could have potentially won all the remaining units bidding one cent. To the
contrary, they decided not to bid and instead left the auction. For example, on January 22,
1954, units 1 to 16 were sold to seven different farmers but no one bid for units 17 to 20
(Figure 7). In 1954 we observe similar behavior for 14 weeks,23 and this is consistent along
the remaining years in our sample. To infer participation costs, we use 2, 423 auctions where
some bidders where present and no one bid for the last units, i.e., auctions similar to the
one in Figure 7. Our interpretation is that the utility for all bidders is smaller than the
participation cost, conditional on covariates. We use this information to partially identify
participation costs (see page 23).
3.1 Set Up
We use the three main specific features from the empirical setting to build our model. A
SC is incurred only for the first unit bought while DMR are present for second to fourth
units. The relative importance of the SC and DMR generate a trade-off, whereby bidders
play one strategy of another based on whether different units are complements or substitutes.
A simple way to show this intuition is by assuming that the initial SC is proportional to the
value of water, and DMR are linear in the number of units bought. We parametrize the SC
effect by (1  ρ1) vi. The interpretation of SC is the percentage of water loss from the first
21A summary is available online in the online appendix at http://www.jdonna.org/water-auctions-web.
22Note that the results would be the same if participation costs were zero. However, the equilibrium when
goods are complements would not be unique (see subsection 2.2).
23Weeks of January 22, February 5, April 5, May 1, May 8, May 15, May 22, May 29, June 5, June 12,
July 3, July 10, November 26, and December 3.
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unit bought because water is flowing through a dry channel (hence, the SC is proportional
to the valuation of the bidder for the unit of water). When the SC is zero, ρ1 = 1. In this
case the bidder obtains the complete first unit (i.e. 100 percent of the first unit). When the
SC is positive, ρ1 < 1, a percentage of the water is lost and the bidder obtains ρ1 of the first
unit (i.e. ρ1 ⇥ 100 percent of the first unit). One would expect that, conditional on rain,
water loss would be constant within season and relatively higher (lower ρ1) in summer.
24 We
parametrize the DMR of unit k by ρk for k = 1, 2, . . . , K. Let ρ be the vector of parameters
that characterizes marginal utilities, i.e. ρ ⌘ (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρK). Then, the marginal utility for
bidder i for each unit k is:
MUki = ρk · vi,
where vi, only known by bidder i, is a scalar that captures the valuation that the bidder
assigns to their first (complete) unit of water, i.e., when ρ1 = 0 we have MU1i = vi.
We consider vi to be independent and identically distributed on the interval R+, according
to the cumulative distribution function F (vi), for all bidders i = 1, . . . , N . We assume that
F (vi) admits a continuous density f (vi) > 0 and has full support. It is assumed that
E[vi] < 1. Let µ be the parameter that fully characterizes the distribution F (vi). The
private valuation, vi, is only known by bidder i, and it is learned before entering the first
auction.25 Farmers are price takers in both the input and the output markets. Farmers
compete in the output market and sell their production in the international market (e.g.
international markets for apricot, oranges, lemon, etc.). The market share of the output
produced by Mula’s farmers is negligible in the international market, thus the prices of the
output in the international market are not affected by Mula’s production. The farmers who
compete in the auction are only those with irrigable land, and they make a small fraction
of all farmers in Mula. They are price takers in the market for inputs, such as labor and
manure. Thus, there are no common components to the valuation of the bidders, conditional
on the observables (e.g. rainfall, day of the week, time of the day, etc.).
The seller wants to allocate K identical units. These units are auctioned off sequentially
by the seller using an English ascending price auction for every unit. All participating
bidders observe the total number of individuals who participate in the auction, N . After
every auction, each participant observes both the price paid by the winner and the winner’s
identity. The seller continues to run subsequent auctions sequentially until all the units are
allocated. The primitives of the model, (K,N, µ, ρ), are common knowledge. We assume that
all bidders share the same utility function, U (·). We think this is reasonable in the present
24We discuss variation of SC across auctions (conditional on covariates) in page 21 in the paper.
25We do not consider the case where farmers might have different valuations for different units of water.
The reason for this is that the units are identical and we condition on observables that may affect the price of
water in the econometric specification (see section 4.1). We obtained similar results by allowing the valuation
for subsequent units to be different draws from the same distribution. The exposition of the model, however,
becomes more cumbersome.
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setting for the following reasons. First, all plots are located within a small area (less than 4
km2) and have the same land quality and weather. Second, although farmers may harvest
different crops, they all have similar water needs per tree across the year. Idiosyncratic
differences in water needs in a specific week are captured in our econometric specification
by the farmer’s type, vi. Finally, the system of canals is such that all the plots are located
within a few hundred meters from the mail canal. Sub-canals coming from the main canal
have all about the same length and are dug into the ground.
The strategy set for every bidder is the vector σ ⌘
 
yki , b
k
i
 k=1,...,K
i=1,...,N
, where yki 2 {0, 1},
yki = 1 indicates that bidder i participates in the auction for unit k (y
k
i = 0 if bidder i does
not participate in the auction for unit k), and bki is the maximum amount that bidder i is
willing to pay for unit k. Bidders play sequentially, or stage by stage. This means that they
choose σki =
 
yki , b
k
i
 
after learning the outcome of the previous (k   1) auctions. Bidders
participating in auction k observe the price at which each bidder is no longer active (bids are
observable) except for the winning bid. The information transmission is consistent with the
auction being an English (or ascending price) auction rather than a second price auction.26
The seller allocates the unit to the highest bidder: xkj 2 {0, 1} and x
k
j = 1 when j =
argmaxi
 
bki
 
(and 0 otherwise), at a price equal to the second highest bid: pk = bkl , where
l = argmaxi 6=j
 
bki
 
. Let Xki ⌘
Pj=k
j=1 x
j
i .be the number of units that bidder i has won before
participating in auction k. If only one bidder participates in a specific auction this bidder
obtains the object for free. Each object is either allocated to one of the N bidders, or it is
lost if none of the bidders decide to participate in the auction.
Participation decisions in each auction are done simultaneously by all bidders. To take
part in every auction each bidder incurs a participation cost, c > 0, at the beginning of the
period.If only one bidder participates, this bidder obtains the object for free but it bears
the participation cost, c, nonetheless. The process is then repeated in every period.27 As
discussed in previous subsection, the assumption of positive entry costs is consistent with the
data in our empirical setting, where we observe no demand for some of the units, even though
the reservation price is zero. The interpretation is that, in those situations where no-demand
is observed, the value that bidders assign to that unit is smaller than the participation cost,
c.28
The ex-post utility for a bidder who buys l units and participates in m auctions is:
26We model the game as in a button auction. Each bidder holds a button while the price continuously
rises. A bid for bidder i is the value at which bidder i stops holding the button. When there are only two
bidders active (holding the button) and one of them releases the button, the auction ends. The active bidder
wins the object and pays the price at which the runner up stopped. See Cassady (1967) and Milgrom and
Weber (1982) for details.
27Bidders enter the auction if, and only if, the expected utility they obtain from the game is positive. See
von der Fehr (1994) for a discussion of entry when the goods are complements or the conditions needed for
entry when the entry cost in the first auction is positive.
28We later use this information to partially identify participation costs (see page 23). See above in this
section for justification of this assumption in our specific empirical setting.
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Ui (l,m, vi; ρ, c) =
lX
k=1
ρk · vi  
KX
k=1
yki · c =
lX
k=1
ρk · vi  m · c.
In the remainder of the paper we refer to vN :N as the highest realization of the random
variables v1, . . . , vn drawn independently from CDFs F1, . . . , FN (one draw from each distri-
bution), and vN 1:N , as the second highest realization. More generally, vj:N is the j
th order
statistic for a sample of size N from the distribution F (vi).
We follow von der Fehr (1994) and assume that the entry cost is small enough so that
the expected payoff of entering is greater than zero for all bidders. This assumption has no
impact on the bidding behavior of subsequent auctions because no information is revealed
before entering the first auction, but it greatly simplifies the notation and the analysis. We
summarize this in the next assumption A0.
Assumption 0 [A0]: E [Ui (l,m, vi; ρ, c)   0] . If A0 is not satisfied, then some bidders
may not enter the first auction. In the paper we only consider symmetric equilibria. Thus, in
the first stage all bidders play the same entry strategy.29 This strategy is a threshold strategy,
i.e., each bidder enters the game if, and only if, its own valuation, vi, is greater than some
common threshold, v⇤. This threshold value depends on the expected value of participating
in the game. In particular, v⇤ is the valuation that would make a player indifferent between
entering the game or not, because its expected utility of participating would be zero. The
expected utility would be a function of the parameters of the game and the number of players.
It is straightforward to see that, when considering symmetric equilibria, the expected
utility of entering the game after the first auction (second, third, or fourth auctions) is al-
ways lower than that of entering the game in the first auction. In other words, individuals
whose valuation was below v⇤ and did not enter the first auction, never find optimal to enter
subsequent stages. The previous result implies that we only observe bids from individuals
that enter the first stage. In the data, we do not observe whether individuals bid in previous
auctions, we only observe winning bids. Hence, we cannot recover the unconditional under-
lying distribution of bids, F (vi), but rather the underlying distribution of bids conditional
on entering the first auction, i.e., F ⇤ (vi) = F (vi|vi > v
⇤). Note that when c goes to zero,
v⇤ goes to zero and the two distributions coincide. Given that our estimates for c are very
small (less than 14 cents of a peseta), the difference between both distributions is small. For
a discussion on selection due to entry costs see, e.g.,Li and Zheng (2009, 2012) and Marmer,
Shneyerov, and Xu (2013).
29By restricting attention to symmetric equilibria we rule out equilibria where some bidders do not enter
the first auction to learn about the types of its opponents, and then decide whether to enter the remaining
auctions.
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3.2 Four-Units Auctions.
The next two assumptions allow us to determine the regime under which the game is being
played.
Assumption 1 [A1]: ρ1  ρ4.
Assumption 2 [A2]: ρ1 + ρ2  ρ3 + ρ4.
When K = 4, we call it a strict complements regime when A1 and A2 holds. We call a weak
substitutes regime when neither A1 nor A2 holds. The following results summarize equilib-
rium winning price behavior as a function of the model’s primitives (valuations, SC, DMR,
and participation costs). We later use these results for the estimation. We consider only pure
strategy symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).30 All proofs and extensions are in
section B in the online appendix.
Proposition 1. In a strict complements regime (i.e., when A1 and A2 hold) the pure strategy
symmetric PBE is:
• First auction:
- Participation: bidder i will always participate in the first auction, i.e. y1i = 1.
- Bidding Strategy: b1i (vi) =
4P
k=1
ρk · vi   4c.
• Second, third, and fourth auctions:
- Participation: bidder i participates in each auction if, and only if, she won the
first auction, i.e. yki = 1 if, and only if, x
1
i = 1.
- Bidding Strategy: If bidder i participates in each auction (yki = 1 for k = 2, 3, 4),
she will continue bidding until the price reaches its own valuation for all remaining
units, bli(vi) =
4P
k=l
ρk · vi   (4  l) c.
Corollary 1. In a strict complements regime (i.e., when A1 and A2 hold) the ex-post utility
of the winner satisfies:
4X
k=1
pk =
4X
k=1
ρk · vN 1:N   4c. (1)
30When K = 2, cases where ρ2  0 and ρ1 = ρ2 are equivalent to von der Fehr (1994), in subsections 3.2
and 3.4, respectively. Uniqueness, however, is not proved by von der Fehr in any of those cases.
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Lemma 1. In a weak substitutes regime (i.e., when neither A1 nor A2 holds) the probability
that a bidder different from the winner enters the last auction is decreasing in the participation
cost, c. Moreover, this probability goes to 1 when c goes to zero, i.e.:
Lim
c!0
 
Pr
 
yKi = 1 | x
1
j = 1, i 6= j
  
= 1.
Corollary 2. In a weak substitutes regime (i.e., when neither A1 nor A2 holds) the ex-post
marginal utility of the winner in the last auction, depending on how many units the winner
won, satisfies:
If the winner won all four units:
ρ4 · vN :N   p
4 = ρ1 · vN 1:N   c. (2)
If the winner won three units, two out of the first three, and the last one:
ρ3 · vN :N   p
4 = ρ2 · vN 1:N   c. (3)
In equation 2 the winner wins all the units, so its marginal utility is ρ4 · vN :N . Since the
winner won all units, the runner up did not win any unit and its marginal utility is ρ1 ·vN 1:N .
In equation 3 the winner wins three units, so its marginal utility is ρ3 · vN :N . The runner-up
won one of the previous units and its marginal utility is: ρ2 · vN 1:N .
4 Estimation
4.1 Econometric Specification
We estimate the model via maximum likelihood using an exponential distribution for the
individual valuations. In this subsection we describe how the likelihood is formed and how
we account for rain expectations and auction heterogeneity.
Regime Determination. The predicted price pattern by our model for each each regime
(strict complements and weak substitutes) provides us with a straightforward method to
determine the regime being played. When goods are strict complements, very low prices—or,
according to the auctioneer who ran the auctions, symbolic prices that are “close” to zero
(Botía, interview, available in the online appendix)—are paid, by the winner of the first unit,
for the second, third, and fourth units (Panel B in Figure 1). Thus, the difference between
the price paid for the first and the remaining units is large. When goods are substitutes, the
units might be bought by different bidders and the prices of all four units are similar (Panel
A in Figure 1). Thus, the difference between the price paid for the first and the remaining
units is negligible. This allows to separate the data into four categories by looking at the
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identities of the winner (i.e. whether the same bidder bought all the four units), and the
difference between the price paid for the first and the remaining units:31,32
a) Same bidder wins all four units and goods are in a strict complements regime (i.e.
when A1 and A2 hold),
b) Same bidder wins all four units and goods are in a weak substitutes regime (i.e. when
neither A1 nor A2 holds),
c) Last winner also bought two out of the first three units, three units in total, and goods
are in a weak substitutes regime (i.e., when neither A1 nor A2 holds),
d) Otherwise.
Categories a, b, and c define the three mutually exclusive regions of the likelihood. In
region a, winning prices are determined by equation 1. In region b, winning prices are
determined by equation 2. In region c, winning prices are determined by equation 3. Let Da
be an indicator variable that equals 1 if the winning price is in region a, and 0 otherwise.
Define analogously Db, Dc for regions b, and c, respectively. See subsection 4.2 for a discussion
about the regions of the likelihood and the covariates. Note that we do not use the data in
region d. In order to use the data in region d we would need to make additional assumptions:
(i) regarding the parameter space, (ii) regarding the distribution of types, and (iii) to fully
solve the model when neither A1 or A2 holds. This is beyond the scope of this paper. As
we discussed above, we are able to recover the parameters of interest only using the data in
regions a, b, and c.
Identification. For the case of an English auction, the conditional distribution of private
valuations is non-parametrically identified when the transaction price and the number of
bidders are observable (Athey and Haile 2002). This result is immediately useful in our
sequential English auction model where bids are conditional-independent draws from a dis-
tribution FV (.) and the equilibrium (observed) transaction price is a function of the second
highest valuation, vN 1:N . Consider the strict complements regime. Winning prices are de-
termined by equation 1. The distribution of valuations is identified up to the multiplying
constant,
4P
k=1
ρk, using equation 1 and the result from Athey and Haile (2002). Identification
of the remaining parameters, ρk, would require four additional independent restrictions (in
addition to equation 1). Two additional restrictions are provided by the model from corol-
lary 2 (equations 2 and 3). But we observe only winning bids in the data. Then, two of
the four ρk, k = 1, . . . , 4, are not identified without further structure. We use a specification
31See section C in the online appendix for details.
32In principle one could estimate a simultaneous equation switching regression model along the lines of
Porter (1983) and Ellison (1994). In such model, the parameters that characterize demand would be estimated
as in this section conditional on the regime classification; the regime classification would be unknown, and the
parameters governing the distribution of the regime classification would be estimated by, e.g., an adaptation
of the E-M algorithm (Kiefer 1980). However, in our case we can determine the regime classification directly
by examining the data, from the observed prices. The first-order distinguishing feature of the regime are the
predicted price patterns by the theoretical model. Panels A and B in Figure 1 show one instance of how
these patterns look throughout the data. This is the most straightforward and, thus, our preferred approach.
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with linear DMR due to the mentioned data limitation. Linear DMR impose two additional
restrictions. First, we define ρ1 = 1 α and ρ2 = 1 β. (Note that these are not restrictions
on the parameter space.) We then restrict the parameter space by assuming that ρ3 = 1 2β
and ρ4 = 1 3β (i.e. linear DMR). Hence, we have three independent restrictions (equations
1, 2, and 3) and three parameters to estimate (µ,α, β), where µ is a parameter that fully
characterizes the distribution of valuations.33 With observability of all bids (not just the
winning bids as in our empirical setting), ρ3 and ρ4 would be identified and we would not
need to impose the linearity assumption on marginal returns.34
Equation 2 establishes the relation between ρ1 and µ (α and µ). Equation 3 establishes
the relation between ρ2 and µ (β and µ). Finally, equation 1 establishes the relation between
ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4 and µ (α, β and µ). If DMR are not linear, then equations 2 and 3 would
still hold. That is, ρ1 = 1   α measures the value of first unit bought, net of the sunk cost
and ρ2 = 1   β measures the value of the second unit bought, including a decline in the
value due to DMR. However, equation 1 would not hold. In particular, the term multiplying
vN 1:N would no longer be equal to
4P
k=1
ρk =
⇥
4  α  6βCt
⇤
, but would still be a function of
α and βCt . That means that the estimation method proposed here could be applied to other
specific (non-linear) functional forms of DMR just by changing equation 1. In general, we
can characterize the DMR function as ρk = k (β), while fixing ρ1 = 1   α and ρ2 = 1   β
without loss of generality. In the linear case we let ρk = k (β) = 1   (k   1)β, but the
estimation method could incorporate other non-linear functional forms, which would only
change equation 1.
Specification of Decreasing Marginal Returns (DMR). For our estimation we allow
DMR, βt, to vary across auctions holding fixed SC, α (more about this below). We allow
βt to vary with farmers’ expectations of rain in each auction t = 1, . . . , T . We proxy these
expectations by actual (i.e. observed) future rain, so βt = β0 + β1R
F
t , where R
F
t is a dummy
variable (defined next) that is linked to expectations about future rain in t, and β0 and β1
are parameters. RFt = 1 if farmers expect that rain is going to be positive (for the day for
which they are buying water) and zero otherwise. We further let βt have different intercepts
in each regime:
βSt = β
S
0 + β
S
1 R
F
t
βCt = β
C
0 + β
C
1 R
F
t
. (4)
Table 4 provides an heuristic argument to understand the reasons behind this equation.
The table presents probit regressions of a dummy variable identifying the regime (strict
complements vs. weak substitutes) on future rain and other covariates. We interpret future
33Note, however, that the distribution of private valuations is non-parametrically identified from the result
from Athey and Haile 2002.
34Note that assumptions A1 and A2 are equivalent to assume that α   4β.
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rain in these regressions as a proxy for aggregate expected future rain for the farmers. Table 4
shows that low expected rain and high demand months (May to August) significantly increase
the likelihood of being in a strict complements regime. The interpretation is that farmers
have some information (expectations) about future rain. While the idiosyncratic component
of this information is captured by their type, vi, the common component is captured by βt.
When farmers expect, on aggregate, no rain in a given day, they will play the strategies
corresponding to the strict complements regime. Seasonality also affects the demand for
water and affects the position of a farmer in the production curve. The results in Table
4 show that it is the slope on the marginal return effect that drives the change of regime,
holding fixed SC.
In our parametrization we fix α across auctions and season but we allow βt to vary. We
expect α to vary across auctions and seasons as well. But this variation is not separately
identified from the variation on βt because it is the relative magnitude of the effects that
matters. The rationale for why we let βt vary (instead of α) is that a regime switch is driven
by the (residual) demand for water by the farmers, as determined by rain and seasonal effects.
In other words, we expect the changes in βt to be more important in magnitude than the
changes in α. Therefore, the estimated changes in βt should be interpreted relative to changes
with respect to α.35
The Likelihood. The econometric problem consists of finding the parameter that char-
acterizes the common distribution of valuations F and the structural parameters that best
rationalize the bidding data. As discussed in the previous section, the bid levels at which
bidders drop out of the auctions are not observed, except the bidder with the second-highest
valuation. We estimate the model via maximum likelihood assuming that farmers draw inde-
pendent and private valuations from an exponential distribution at each four-units auction,
conditional on observed auction-specific covariates. (We discuss the assumptions below in
subsection 4.2.)
Our model and the context of the market under analysis provide insight on how the
characteristics of farmers and auctions should affect private values, but it offers little guidance
on the functional form of this distribution. We assume that farmers’ valuations, vi, follow
an an exponential distribution for each four-units auction.36 In subsection 5 we report the
results from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test where the null hypothesis that the distribution of
private valuations are draws from an exponential distribution cannot be rejected.
Let vi ⇠ F (v;µ), where F (v;µ) = (1  e
 µv) 1 {v   0} is the CDF of an exponential
35We obtained similar results to the ones on Tables 5 and 6 fixing β and allowing αt to vary in each auction
t = 1, . . . , T .
36In our earlier working paper Donna and Espin-Sanchez (2012) we used an Exponentiated Gamma (EG)
distribution The EG distribution gives us a closed-form solution for the PDF of the jth order statistic and is
characterized by a single parameter. Additionally, the PDF of the jth order statistic of a EG is a weighted
average of several PDF of EG. This implies that the PDF of any order statistic of an EG distribution also
has a closed-form solution.
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distribution that is characterized by the scalar µ > 0. Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4 jointly
identify the parameter vector
 
µ,α, βC0 , β
S
0 , β
C
1 , β
S
1
 
, conditional on the regime and exogenous
covariates, RFt . The full system of equations is given by:
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4P
k=1
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⇥
4  α  6βCt
⇤
vN 1:N   4c
p4b = (1  α)vN 1:N   c
p4c = (1  β
S
t )vN 1:N   c
βSt = β
S
0 + β
S
1 R
F
t
βCt = β
C
0 + β
C
1 R
F
t .
(5)
Let θ ⌘ (α, βC0 , β
S
0 , β
C
1 , β
S
1 ) and let vi be a conditional-independent draw from F (·;µ|θ, R
F
t ).
Then, the likelihood function is given by:
L(·;µ | θ, RFt ) =
TY
t=1
fN−1:N
 P
4
k=1 p
k
t + 4c
4  α  6(βC
0
+ βC
1
RFt )
;µ | θ, RFt
!Dat
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p4t + c
1  α
;µ | θ, RFt
!Dbt
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p4t + c
1  βS
0
+ βCS R
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;µ | θ, RFt
!Dct
,
(6)
where fN 1:N(v;µ) is the probability density function (PDF) of the (N   1)
th order statis-
tic from a sample of N from the exponential distribution of valuations F , and Dat , D
b
t , D
c
t
are, respectively, indicator variables for cases a, b, and c, as defined above at the beginning
of this subsection .
Auction Heterogeneity. We allow the mean of the distribution of valuations to depend
on various characteristics that are drawn from the data. We assume that observed prices
follow a linear function of the following exogenous variables and estimate all parameters
using the likelihood function:38
E
 
vit
 
= Z 0tγ = γ0 + γ1R
P
t + γ2
 
RPt
 2
+ γ3Nightt +
5X
k=2
γ2+kDay
k
t +
12X
k=2
γ6+kMonth
k
t . (7)
37The third equation in the system is, actually, p4b = Max {(1  α)vN−1:N , (1  β) vN−2:N}, since we do
not know whether the runner-up in the last auction was the bidder who already won one unit or a bidder
without previous purchases. However, when N is large, (1   α)vN−1:N < (1  β) vN−2:N if β ' α. But, in
the case that β ' α, the same bidder will not win three out of four units. That is, in an auction where N
is large and the same bidder wins three out of four units, we expect β to be significantly greater than α.
Therefore, the equation can be simplified to p4b = (1  α)vN−1:N .
38Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) assume that private values follow a log-normal distribution and let
the mean of the logarithm of the valuations be a linear function of exogenous characteristics. Haile and
Tamer (2003) condition on covariates by constructing the conditional empirical distribution functions using
Gaussian kernels. See Hickman, Hubbard, and Saglam (2011) for a recent guide to the literature on structural
econometric methods in auctions.
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The first exogenous variable, RPt , refers to Past Rain, a moving average of the daily rain
beginning seven days prior to the date of the auction; we include a quadratic term to allow
for non linearities in past rain. The second variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the
water was bought for night use. The next four variables are a set of dummy variables for each
weekday. Finally, the last eleven variables are a complete set of monthly dummy variables to
condition on seasonality. Water prices soar in this market during the dry summer and drop in
winter. We accommodate these shocks to demand with seasonal monthly dummy variables.
See sections E and F in the online appendix for details about the estimation procedure.
Identification and Estimation of Participation Costs. Although, throughout the pre-
vious estimation procedure, participation costs, c, have been fixed at an arbitrary small mag-
nitude, we recover them from our data. We use our model and data where auctions were run,
no bids observed and farmers were present, along with the structural estimates. Participation
costs are identified by the necessary condition for a bidder to bid in the first auction that is
given by:
(1  α)vN :N < c.
More generally, a condition that additionally involves second, third, and fourth marginal
utilities for the case where the bidder also enters the individual auctions for two, three or
four units should be considered. In these cases, participation costs are also greater than the
average marginal utility for second, third, and fourth units. Formally:
Max
⇢
1  α,
2  α  βt
2
,
3  α  2βt
3
,
4  α  3βt
4
 
vN :N < c. (8)
Note that, when α < βt, the former condition is sufficient, implying the latter. In our
econometric specification the structural parameter α is fixed while the parameter βt varies
according to the farmers’ expectations of (exogenous) future rain. One would expect to
observe auctions without bids when farmers’ expectations for rain, as captured by actual
future rain, are high (which in the model is represented by a relatively high βt). Therefore,
absence of bids will only occur when α < βt, thus, the former identification restriction is
sufficient.
Analogously, using the model and the remaining data not used in the structural estima-
tion, we obtain an upper bound using that participation cost are lower than the minimum
registered price (conditional on covariates, sunk cost, and DMR).
4.2 Discussion
Conditional Independent Private Valuations (CIPV). For the estimation we assume
that farmers have independent and private valuations at each four-units auction, conditional
on observed auction-specific covariates. The first justification for CIPV is that each bidding
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farmer (who may or may not be a water-owner) has his own land extension, and his own
mixture of trees and crops. This eliminates a strict common value scenario. In addition, in
the econometric specification we account for observables that affect all farmers in a similar
way such as (past and future) rainfall, schedule of the auction, day of the week, weather
seasonality, etc. (see subsection 4.1 for details). Second, the products sold are units of water.
Assuming that farmers have private information from other farmers about the characteristics
of this product is not in line with the homogeneous nature of water units. Finally, the
conditional-independence assumption is the most credible in our context, given the varying
nature of farming products and soil conditions across farmers. To understand why, recall that
sellers in the water market are a holding formed by the water owners and buyers are farmers
that own fertile land. Around 500 different farmers are observed to win auctions in our
sample. Not all of these farmers show up at every auction or decide to participate if they are
present. Farming products cultivated in the area are mainly fruit and citrus trees (lemon,
orange, peach, mandarin, and apricot), and vegetables (tomato, lettuce, and onion). The
amount of water required by the trees depends on the time of the year and type of crop (citrus
trees should not be irrigated daily). Moreover, and given that we condition on seasonality,
water requirements vary across products. For example, water needs for grapefruit and lemons
are about 20% higher than those for oranges, while water requirements for mandarins are
about 10% less. Ground conditions (which also vary across areas where different farmers have
their land) also affect water necessity.39 The variations across farmers generated by these
factors provide support for the fact that the conditional-independence assumption seems
satisfied, given that each day the market is quite specific and since we work with data for
four-consecutive auctions as a unit of analysis (sequential auctions).40
Auction Heterogeneity. Observed heterogeneity across auctions arises due to seasonal
effects, rain, and the day and time of the week when the auction occurs. This means that
the distribution of private values for the tth auction, Ft(·) is not constant across auctions.
In our estimation, we recover the family of distributions F (·|Zt, γ). That is, we assume for
every four-units auction that Ft(·) = F (·|Zt, γ), where γ 2 R
k is a parameter vector and Zt
is a vector of fully observed characteristics describing the environment of the tth auction. We
described the inclusion of these covariates above.
Number of Potential Bidders. The number of potential bidders in each auction, Nt,
is not observed. Moreover, it is not identified (Athey and Haile 2002). We assume that it
is constant for every four-units auction, Nt = N . Table 3 displays the timing structure for
39Table A3 in the online appendix displays appropriate intervals for watering citrus.
40Our justification of the CIPV paradigm is in line with the literature on empirical auctions. For first price
descending auctions see, e.g., Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) in an application to agricultural products
(greenhouse eggplants in Marmande, France) where the number of bidders vary between 11 and 18. For
English auctions, Haile and Tamer (2003) apply their limited structure model to U.S. Forest Service timber
auctions, where the number of bidders vary from 2 to 12.
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different bidders in our sample. For our estimation, we let the number of potential bidders
in each auction be the yearly average of different farmers who won auctions in our sample.41
We estimate the model using different values of N for robustness.42
Unobserved Heterogeneity. Throughout, we have assumed that the vector Zt of covari-
ates is fully observed by the econometrician. In our environment, unobserved heterogeneity
implies that the distribution of bids may not be conditional-independent across t. All farmers
may, for example, observe some factor unobservable by the researcher that shifts the location
of the distribution values. This unobserved heterogeneity could lead to correlation among
bidders’ valuations, causing an identification problem and inconsistent estimates to arise.43
Modeling unobserved heterogeneity may require additional assumptions on the behavior of
unobservables, such as independence, separability, strict monotonicity, and is beyond the
scope of this paper.44
Dynamic Strategic Considerations. The way in which the auction system is carried out
every week raises the question of the importance of dynamic strategic considerations between
four-units auctions both among days (Monday to Friday for a specific schedule) and between
schedules (day-time vs night-time for a specific day). Tables 1 and 2 show that winning prices
decline across days (for a given schedule) and at night (for a given day), which is consistent
with the literature on empirical sequential auctions. These dynamic strategic considerations
are outside the scope of the present investigation, and we abstract from them in the model.
We account for these issues with a set of dummy variables. Our reduced-form regressions
in Table 2 show correlations between average winning prices “within four-units blocks” and
a set of covariates. These covariates (which include “schedule” dummy variables for day vs.
night irrigation, a set of dummy variables for the day of the week of the irrigation, and a
“seasonal” set of monthly dummy variables) account for these dynamics, in that the residuals
41The agricultural products that are cultivated in the area are mainly citrus trees, which are harvested
once per year. The number of different bidders who bought at least one unit during a specific year constitutes
a good approximation of the number of farmers who were actively bidding in each four-units auction during
that year. The monthly average of different bidders who bought water in the sample (years 1954 to 1966) is
8.31 (Table 3).
42In Table 5 we present the results for N 2 {8, 10}. We have performed a sensitivity analysis to different
values of Nt that are consistent with the pattern observed in Table 3 and the evidence described in section
2. In addition, we broke the sample into four periods and performed the estimation independently in each
period allowing the mean value of Nt to vary by period. We obtained similar results to the ones reported in
Table 5.
43From the agricultural census data we observe individual characteristics of the farmers which we are able
to link to the winning bids. Given the structure of the agricultural water market we are modeling, it does not
appear to be an important concern once we consider the homogeneity of the selling good and the observed
characteristics we introduce in our estimations (seasonality, past and future rain, among others).
44For a discussion on this issue see, among others, Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) for an application to tim-
ber auctions, and Krasnokutskaya (2011) for a semi-parametric approach to Michigan highway procurement
contracts. Roberts (2009) uses information contained in reserve prices to allow bidders’ private signals to
depend on the realization of the unobserved heterogeneity. Balat (2013) allows for unobserved heterogeneity
using dynamic auctions in the highway procurement market.
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after including these covariates (i.e., both the residuals from the reduced-form regressions in
Table 2, and the residuals from the structural model in Tables 5 and 6) are uncorrelated with
any of the observables in our data. Thus, we believe that our structural empirical analysis
does not suffer from an omitted variable bias, and that the dummy variables effectively
account for those dynamic issues.
In particular we can distinguish three types of dynamics in this market: a) Within four-
units blocks; b) across four-units blocks (within week); c) across weeks. Incorporating all
these dynamics into the structural model would be too cumbersome. We are addressing a)
in the current paper, and we address c) in Donna and Espin-Sanchez (2016). In this paper
we use “schedule” dummy variables to account for b), and seasonal effects to account for c).
Moreover, in this paper we could have assumed that each bidder observes a vector of ten
values at the beginning of the week, each value corresponding to the valuation, vi, for each
of the ten four-units cuartas. In this case units across four-units block would be ex-ante
equivalent, and the dynamics across four-units block would be modeled as in McAfee and
Vincent (1993). Alternatively we could assume that bidders begin the auction on Friday only
knowing their valuations for the Monday-night cuartas, and only after that auction is finished
they learn their valuation for the next set of four cuartas (in this case, Tuesday-night), and
so on. In that case the proper model would be Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), and the objects
would be stochastically equivalent.
However, it is important to note that, even if present, dynamic behavior considerations do
not invalidate the model’s assumptions. As emphasized above, the conditional-independent
units of analysis are four-units auctions (not day-auctions of eight units or week-auctions of
40 units) which, conditional on covariates, are homogeneous goods. As can be seen from the
correlations presented in Table 2, previous patterns are consistent along the whole sample and
robust to the inclusion of a whole set of fixed effects and covariates. The principal difference
between prices in these four-units auctions is related to the uncertainty of future rain. As it
is explained above, we include covariates for schedule, day-of-the-week, and past rain in our
structural estimation that capture technological or strategic effects. Future rain, on the other
hand, is also included as a proxy for farmers’ beliefs to account for these possible strategic
behaviors unaccounted by previous covariates. In that sense, our estimates should be inter-
preted as four-units day-schedule specific auctions, conditional on past rain and seasonality.
It seems implausible that after accounting for these observables and unobservables,45 and
given that the relevant unit of analysis is the four-units auction, dynamic behavior would
affect our results concerning individual demand.46
45While farmers use their reasonable good predictions in their decisions, we use actual future rainfall in
our estimation.
46Once we condition on these covariates, the concern that a bidder’s outside option would vary according
to the day of the week (or schedule) is addressed by redefining the idiosyncratic individual valuation in such
a way that the new one be the original valuation net of the outside option. By normalizing the outside option
of Friday-night to zero the model’s assumptions remain valid.
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Regions of the Likelihood and Covariates. Another concern may be selection in the
regions of the likelihood. As emphasized in subsection 4.1, categories a, b, and c define the
three mutually exclusive regions of the likelihood. (In region a, winning prices are determined
by equation 1. In region b, winning prices are determined by equation 2. In region c, winning
prices are determined by equation 3.) Table A4 in the online appendix displays a comparison
of the covariates in the three regions of the likelihood. As expected, prices are higher in
the strict complements regime (region a) relative to the weak substitutes regime (regions b
and c). This is because the amount of rainfall is lower under the strict complements regime
(region a) relative to the weak substitutes regime (regions b and c). Rainfall is lower in region
a) (relative to regions b and c) due to weather seasonalities: the percentage of observations in
Apr-May (when the agricultural products need the water the most) is substantially higher in
region a) (strict complements) relative to regions b) and c) (weak substitutes). The opposite
is true during the low demand season (Jan-Mar and Oct-Dec). Finally, note that there is no
substantial variation (between the strict complement and weak substitutes regimes) in terms
of the percentage of observations by Schedule (day or night) and Weekday (Mo, Tu, We, Th,
and Fr).
5 Estimation Results, Counterfactuals, and Discussion
5.1 Estimation Results
In this section we present the estimation results under various econometric specifications.
We let private valuations for each four-units auction follow an exponential distribution, and
follow the described estimation procedure. As discussed above, the number of bidders, N ,
is determined by the monthly average of different bidders who bought water in the sample
(years 1954 to 1966). In this 13-year sample, the average is slightly above 8. Each of these
farmers regularly won auctions. It is reasonable to assume that they attended the auctions.
Tables 5 and 6 present our estimation results. Columns 1, 3, and 5 present the estimates for
N = 8, while columns 2, 4, and 6 do it for N = 10.47 For each specification, we present the
estimates of the model’s structural parameters in Table 5 and the estimates of the covariates
in Table 6. Table 6 is the continuation of Table 5. That is, for each specification (column)
in Table 5, Table 6 displays the estimates of the covariates in that specification.
47In their simulated Non Linear Least Squares (NLLS) estimation, Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995)
search for the best value of N by minimizing a lack-of-fit criterion (proposition 4). Note that, as discussed in
subsection 4.1, identification of the distribution of valuations and structural parameters of our model requires
observation of the total number of bidders. The rationale for this is straightforward: whether second highest
realization of the random variable vi is from a sample of size N = 10, or from a sample of size N = 100, it is
crucial to interpret the second highest bid (observable in our data). Although observation of an additional
order statistic can eliminate this requirement (Song 2004), this would require imposing further structure on
the distribution of beliefs in our model (to interpret auctions where, for example, three different farmers win
auctions), which is outside the scope of this investigation. Moreover, we only observe winning bids in the
data (see section 2).
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All parameters have the expected signs. We use the estimate of the parameter γ (that
characterizes the distribution of private valuations), to compute the mean valuation of the
first complete unit of water. In the case of column 3, the value of the first complete unit
of water is 155.78 pesetas. As expected, in the specification in column 4 (with 10 different
bidders), the mean value of the first complete unit of water is slightly lower, 135.20 pesetas.
The parameter βR1 , R 2 {C, S} captures the effect of future rain. As farmers’ expectations
of future rain increase, DMR are more severe (βR1 > 0, R 2 {C, S}). This increases farmers’
likelihood of playing the strategies of a not-strict complements regime (see Table 4) and thus
reduces their valuation of subsequent units of water (
∂pi
t
∂RF
t
< 0). Predicted DMR are obtained
by adding the estimates of intercepts, βˆR0 , R 2 {C, S}, to the estimates of the slope, βˆ
R
1 ,
R 2 {C, S}, conditional on the rain on the day of the auction. When evaluated at the average
future rain from each regime, the following null hypothesis (joint test) that overall DMR are
lower in the strict complements regime (as predicted by the model) cannot be rejected (p-
value above 10%). H0 : βˆ
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t , Ts, and Tc are the number of auctions in not-strict complements
and strict complements regimes, respectively.
The estimates of the SC parameter, α, are statistically significant in all specifications.
Given the choice of parametrization for sunk costs, the parameter estimates can be interpreted
as the percentage loss in terms of a complete unit of water (section 3). For our estimate in
column 3 this represents a loss of 4.75 pesetas (using the mean value of 155.78 pesetas for a
complete unit).
The estimated coefficients for covariates have the expected sign. For specification 3,
for instance, prices in August (February) are significantly 234.08 pesetas higher (11.30 ptas
lower) than on January. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that water is more
(less) valuable during these months because of high (low) water demand. Also as expected,
past rain decreases observed prices in the data. For specification in column 3, an increase in
the average rainfall by 1 mm from the previous week (with respect to the day of irrigation),
decreases average conditional price of a unit of water by 1.61 pesetas.
Participation cost are recovered using data where auctions were run with farmers present,
but no bids were placed, along with the identifying restriction that holds in such cases.48 Out
of the 3, 203 auctions where no bids were placed, we use the 2, 423 where some bidders where
present (auctions similar to the one in Figure 7). We obtain the following interval estimate
using specification 3: 0.0082 < cˆ < 0.1431. That is, participation costs are positive but small
(less than 14 cents of a peseta). This is in line with the intuition from the model: hassle or
opportunity costs because farmers value their time.
48See page 23.
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5.2 Counterfactuals
In this subsection we use the estimated model to compare the welfare under the three scenarios
described below: myopic farmers, large units, and paved channels. In each counterfactual
scenario we compare the welfare relative to the benchmark case in specification 3 from tables
5 and 6.
5.2.1 Welfare Scenarios
Myopic Farmers
In our setting we define a farmer as “myopic” if the farmer does not internalize the effect of
the sunk cost (SC). A myopic farmer would “absorb” the SC, in that it would bid without
accounting for the resulting complementarity effect. The myopic farmer, however, would still
be affected by the SC. Thus, using the notation from our model, myopic farmers incorrectly
believe that α = 0, and bid according to standard English auction model. Myopic farmers
correctly account for the decreasing marginal returns effect (DMR).
To compute the counterfactual we use the estimated demand system—characterized by
the estimated private valuations and the model’s structural parameters—from specification 3
from tables 5 and 6, and simulate the bidding behavior assuming that farmers bid according
to a standard English auction model with α = 0 and the estimated DMR effect, βˆ > 0 (from
specification 3 from tables 5 and 6). Then we compute the actual SC absorbed by the farmers
using the actual demand’s estimates (i.e. using the estimated distribution of valuations and
sunk cost, αˆ, from specification 3 from tables 5 and 6). We use the actual setting (i.e. when
famers are not myopic and behave as observed in the data) as a benchmark and report the
efficiency gains/losses relative to this benchmark.
Large Units
We consider an alternative selling mechanism, whereby the cartel would sell “large units.”
We define these large units as a single ascending price English auction per four-units auction.
Thus, farmers are only able to bid for the large four-units auction (i.e. the right to use 12
hours of water for irrigation), not for the individual units (i.e. they cannot buy single units
with the right to use 3 hours of water for irrigation as in the benchmark case).
To compute the counterfactual we use the estimated demand system from subsection 5.1
and simulate the bidding behavior assuming that farmers can only bid for large units. Again,
we use the actual setting (i.e. with non-myopic famers who can buy single units to use 3
hours of water for irrigation) as a benchmark, and report the efficiency gains/losses relative
to this benchmark.
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Paved Channels
Finally, we consider the counterfactual scenario, where the irrigation channels are paved. In
Mula the channels were pavemented in the 1970s(Gómez-Espín, Gil-Meseguer, and García-
Marín (2006)). Paved channels imply that farmers do not incur a SC for the first unit. Under
this counterfactual scenario farmers only incur DMR, not SC. Thus, α = 0 and β > 0.
To compute the counterfactual we use the estimated demand system from subsection 5.1,
and simulate bidding behavior assuming that α = 0 and β > 0. As in the previous cases,
we use the actual setting (i.e. with non-myopic famers, who can buy single units to use 3
hours of water for irrigation, and where α > 0 and β > 0) as a benchmark, and report the
efficiency gains/losses relative to this benchmark.
5.2.2 Welfare Measures
We compute two sets of welfare measures:
Efficiency Gains/Losses per Unit. This measure represents the efficiency gain/loss per
unit (mean across units and farmers), and is measured in pesetas. We also report the standard
deviation, and the largest and smallest efficiency gain/loss.
Total Efficiency Gains/Losses. This measure represents the total efficiency gain/loss in
each counterfactual scenario. The total efficiency measure is the sum (across all units and
farmers) of the gains/losses per unit during the 13 years sample period in our data, and is
also measured pesetas.
For each set of welfare measures we report the efficiency gains/losses due to SC, DMR,
and the total. The latter is defined as the sum of the efficiency gains/losses due to SC plus
DMR.
5.2.3 Welfare Results
Table 7 reports the results from the counterfactual analysis. Myopic consumers incur sub-
stantial losses in terms of absorbing additional SC. They continue to buy the same (expected)
amount of water as in the benchmark scenario. But their bidding behavior ignores the com-
plementarity effect caused by the SC. Each time they buy a unit, they incur an additional SC
and save the corresponding DMR, if they buy only one unit. Panel A shows that, on average,
there is a 28.56 pesetas efficiency loss per unit due to ignoring the presence of SC. Strong
seasonalities indicate that there is substantial heterogeneity in terms of the mean efficiency
loss per unit, with a minimum value of 6 cents and a maximum value of 60.63 pesetas. As
expected, not accounting for the SC generates savings in terms of the DMR because the
latter are only incurred when more than one unit is bought sequentially. Myopic farmers are
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very unlikely to buy more than one unit. Panel B shows that the total efficiency loss due
to the farmers ignoring the presence of SC are substantial: 42, 497.36 pesetas during the 13
years sample period in our data. The savings resulting from incurring less DMR partially
compensates for this loss. The total net loss due to myopic farmers is 1, 846.59 pesetas.
The second counterfactual scenario investigates an alternative selling mechanism, whereby
the cartel would only auction bundles of large four-units. Panels A and B show that this
mechanism would exacerbate the costs arising due to DMR. The mean lost due to DMR
is only 3.27 pesetas. This is because, in the benchmark, when farmers need the water the
most, they buy bundles of four-units (even when they can buy individual units) due to the
complementarity effect generated by the SC. Again, there is substantial heterogeneity in
terms of the mean efficiency loss per unit due to seasonalities: the largest loss due to the
DMR is 615.29 pesetas per unit. As expected, large four-units bundles generate SC savings
that are relatively small (on average 20 cents per unit). Panel B shows that the counterfactual
selling mechanism of large units would generate a net total efficiency loss of 4, 563.74 pesetas
during the 13 years sample period in our data.
The final counterfactual scenario shows what happened in Mula in the 1970s, when the
channels were paved. Paved channels imply that farmers do not incur a SC for the first unit.
This results in a mean efficiency gain of 12.91 pesetas per unit relative to the benchmark
scenario, as reported in Panel A. Farmers continue to incur the DMR and internalize them;
thus there is no change in efficiency due to the DMR. The total net efficiency gain due to
paved channels is large: 19.208.09 pesetas during the 13 years sample period in our data, as
reported in Panel B.
5.3 Discussion
Robustness and Goodness of the Fit. In comparing columns 1-2 and 3-4, it is clear
that the model with covariates outperforms the model without, as shown by the significance
of past rain and seasonal dummy estimates, the increase in the likelihood function, and the
improvement in the goodness of the fit. The main reason is the dependence of prices on sea-
sonal factors, which we capture in our specification with seasonal dummy variables. From the
residual analysis we find no evidence that the increase in the log likelihood function is due to
the parametric misspecification of the value distribution itself. Our specification survives the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, so that the exponential distribution of private valuations cannot
be rejected (for the specification in column 3 the p-value of the test is 41%).49
As regards the goodness-of-fit, our specification in column 3 performs quite well. The
pseudo R2 = 58% is obtained by computing predicted prices by our model: pseudo R2 =
1  
P
T
t=1(pt pˆt)
2
P
T
t=1(pt p¯)
2 , where pˆt are prices predicted by the model and p¯ is the mean of prices.
These results are in line with the R2 obtained in the reduced-form regressions. Although
49We perform the nonparametric test to evaluate the equality of two distributions of valuations: our sample
of private values with a reference from an exponential distribution.
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not directly comparable given the distribution assumptions in the structural approach, the
R2 = 23% in the reduced-form specification with all covariates (column 3 in Table 2) can be
heuristically interpreted as the proportion of variability in the data set that is accounted for
by the covariates. The proportion accounted for by the model without covariates displayed in
column 1 in Table 5 is R2 = 32%.50 As can be seen in Figure 8, our model allows us to follow
winning prices accurately.51 The figure displays real prices against predicted prices using
three different models: (i) our structural model (specification 3 in Table 5), (ii) a standard
English auction model (specification 5 in Table 5, that we discuss in the next subsection),
and (iii) a reduced-form model (specification 4 from Table 2 that includes as regressors Past
Rain and multiple fixed effects, including individual fixed effects).
Understanding the Importance of the Model. We proceed now to analyze our model’s
implications with respect to the importance of SC and DMR. Suppose that the researcher
neglects the dynamics that arise from the model and, instead, estimates a standard English
auction model. Suppose, for instance, that we are in the strict complements regime and
that valuations follow a distribution with mean, µv, and standard deviation, σv. Then, the
estimated mean of the distribution of valuations using the standard model will be underesti-
mated: ˆE (vi)
SM
< E (vi) = µv, where SM stands for standard model. Similarly, the estima-
tion of the standard deviation of valuations will be overestimated: ˆV (vi)
SM
> V (vi) = σv.
52
The same is true in the weak substitutes case.
Overestimation of the variance of the distribution is caused by attributing the variation
in prices (among different units) to a relatively more dispersed underlying distribution. The
farmer actually pays for the whole bundle in the first unit, thus deterring the entrance of other
bidders in the remaining three auctions. The mean is underestimated when the common SC
and DMR are not accounted for in the estimation. In the case of the exponential distribution
used in our specifications, this failure translates into an underestimation of the parameter µ.
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 5 present the estimates from a standard English (button)
auction. Aside from the mentioned bias in the parameter that characterizes the distribution,
the results in these columns indicate that taking SC and DMR into account significantly
contributes to the model’s explanatory power. Figure 8 shows predicted prices from the
standard (button) English auction model (specification 5 in Table 5), and compares them
with actual prices and with those from our structural model (specification 3 in Table 5).53
Consistent with these results, the p-value for the null hypothesis that αˆ = βˆC0 = βˆ
S
0 = βˆ
C
1 =
βˆS1 = cˆ = 0 is less than 10
 4.
50If we additionally add individual fixed effects to the reduced-form specification, the R2 just increases
from 23% to 36% (column 4 in Table 2).
51We describe how we compute the predicted prices in section D in the online appendix. See also section
D in the online appendix for a high definition version of this figure.
52In the strict complements case, and given a fixed number of potential bidders N , the (true) mean and
variance of the N   1 order statistic will be greater than the estimated using the standard model because
the (true) price paid will be [4  α  6βt,c] vN−1:N   4c and not 4vN−1:N (predicted by the standard model).
53See footnote 51.
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An alternative approach is to ask how the incomplete model from Haile and Tamer (2003)
can be adapted to the present case.54 This alternative approach relies on two basic assump-
tions with intuitive appeal: (i) bidders do not bid more than they are willing to pay for a
unit, and (ii) bidders do not allow an opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat.
In our case, with SC and DMR, these two simple assumptions are violated. In the strict
complements regime, bidders bid according to b1i (vi) = [4  α  6β] vi   4c > vi, violating
(i), and no bidder (except the highest type) participates in the second to fourth unit auc-
tions, violating (ii). In the non weak substitutes regime, both assumptions are also violated,
though the intuition is different. In this case, the equilibrium is only partially revealing:
bidders’ strategies are step functions, so the equilibrium is semi-pooling. When α is greater
but close to β, bidders bid above their valuations to intimidate other bidders and deter entry
in the second auction, thus (i) is violated. Additionally, the same argument as in Black and
De Meza (1992) and Liu (2011) applies when goods are substitutes. The winner of the first
auction imposes a negative externality on himself. His willingness to pay for the second unit
is lower than it was for the first unit, making him a weaker bidder in such situations. Given
that all bidders will internalize this effect, some will bid below their marginal utility for the
object in the first auction. The greater are DMR, β, the greater this underbidding effect will
be.
Applying these assumptions to the four-units bundle would not to produce informative
bounds because marginal valuations of the units differ according to the regime and the
number of different winners per four-units auction. Bundling the four-units or even applying
Haile and Tamer’s approach separately for each regime, requires the model in section 3 as an
interpretation of the underlying behavior.55
Complementarities are not Collusion. An alternative hypothesis of farmers’ behav-
ior in the strict complements regime is that bidders might be playing some collusive (non-
competitive) strategy. As emphasized in section 2, the demand side of this market for water
is composed of as many as hundreds of farmers (Table 3). Even when farmers attend the
auction and do not bid, the observed number of different winners is relatively high (Figure
7). (Note that all auctions were run in weeks similar to the one in Figure 7, so water for
units 17-20 was available in the dam to sell.) Farmers compete for water that will ultimately
determine the quality and quantity of their crop, and in some cases, even the survival of
their trees (for example, in drought years). It is unlikely that farmers can make credible col-
lusive commitments in such a situation. Contemporaries emphasized the opposite situation:
farmers competed aggressively for water, especially during droughts, while water owners were
54Larsen (2013) uses a similar approach to Haile and Tamer to obtain bounds about the primitives in an
auction model followed by dynamic bargaining with two-sided incomplete information without solving for
the equilibrium of the game.
55Note also that failure to consider the effect of the structural parameters (SC and DMR) explicitly intro-
duces difficulties.
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reluctant to lower the price of the water to meet the needs of the poorest farmers.56
The high number of non-collusive auctions provides evidence farmers did not collude.
Farmers met every week, hence the discount rate from one week to the next one was close to
1. If we focus on two consecutive four-units auctions, the discount rate is virtually 1. Thus,
any collusive agreement would be easy to sustain and we would observe no “price-wars”, or
deviations from collusive strategies. If the collusion hypothesis were true, all auctions would
look collusive except, perhaps, during certain periods where we would observe price-wars.
We observe in many cases, however, that both regimes are present during the same week.
Unlike Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997) this is not a formal test.57
Nevertheless, taking the analysis one step further, if the collusion hypothesis were true, we
would expect more collusion in autumn-winter and less collusion in spring-summer. Incentives
to deviate from the collusion strategy are higher in spring-summer because the value of the
water is higher due to seasonalities (Figures 2 and Panel A in Figure 3). Punishment is
about the same in any season. The maximum punishment would be to play the competitive
equilibrium forever. Future discounted earnings in this case are similar in summer and in
winter. Hence, deviating from the collusive strategy is more profitable in summer than in
winter. However, the data show the opposite pattern. Figure 9 displays the distribution of
auctions in the complementarities regime by month. Complementarities are more likely to be
observed in summer than in winter, when water requirements (and hence equilibrium prices)
soar. This is in line with our interpretation according to the model with sunk and entry
costs.
A “competitive” collusion? We have implicitly assumed that farmers’ plots were spaced
sufficiently far apart from each other. Specifically, we assumed that no other farmer could
use the same sub-channel just used by his neighbor. In reality, this assumption is not true for
all cases. Because the cost of watering the sub-channel is sunk, if the plots of two farmers are
located next to each other and they share the same sub-channel, then one farmer could free-
ride and outbid the first winner in the second auction. Knowing this, the first winner would
bid lower in the first auction. This situation would reduce the revenue of the auction and
create inefficiencies. Since farmers might not internalize this free-riding effect, they would
take into account the equilibrium outcome for the remaining auctions, and lower their bid in
the first auction. They would then will try to outbid their neighbors in later auctions.
In a situation such as this, it would be relatively easy to sustain a collusive agreement
among neighboring farmers. The number of members of the coalition would be small (say,
three or four farmers), and because they are neighbors, they would know each other well
and might even share animals or machinery for agricultural purposes. Each farmer in the
56These opinions, along with a qualitative analysis can be found in Vera Nicolás (2004).
57Collusion in repeated auctions has been analyzed conditional (Hopenhayn and Skrzypacz 2004) and
unconditional (Porter and Zona 1999 and Pesendorfer 2000) on the history of the game. A discussion on how
to detect collusion can be found in Porter (2005).
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coalition would compete in the auction for the first unit, but would not enter the remaining
auctions if one member of the coalition won the first unit. With this agreement they would
achieve efficiency by solving the free riding problem. With the resulting increase in efficiency,
the revenue of the auction would also increase, and the auctioneer would not be opposed to
the “collusion.” This situation would not affect our results unless farmers coordinated bidding
rings to not outbid neighboring farmers in the first auction.58 59
Efficiency. The model displayed in section 3 assumes that it is costly for the bidders to
enter the auction. In order to compare the sequential ascending price auction with other
mechanisms, this entry cost has to be taken into account. In this context, and following
Stegeman (1996), we interpret entry cost as the cost farmers incur when they send a message
to the auctioneer, or to some other farmers. Here, the notions of ex-ante and ex-post efficiency
are no longer equivalent. Although it may be ex-ante efficient that more than one player
sends a message, it is always ex-post efficient that at most one player sends a message.
For this case, where it is costly to send messages to the planner, Stegeman (1996) shows
that the ascending price auction has an equilibrium that is ex-ante efficient. In contrast,
the first-price auction may have no efficient equilibrium, and the author only considers the
single-unit case. In our sequential unit case, we have shown that when goods are strict
complements the analysis is identical to the single unit case. Hence, the result applies here
as well. However, when goods are weak substitutes, the result only applies to the last auction.
Although outside the scope of this paper, further work to investigate whether a sequential
ascending price auction is ex-post efficient when the planner has to allocate several objects
to players that face SC, DMR, and costly messages, would be a useful extension.
6 Conclusions
By affecting bidders’ behavior in sequential auctions, sunk costs and decreasing marginal
returns (DMR) in the presence of participation costs generate very different price dynamics
within the same market. This difference in price dynamics is attributable to the varying
extent to which the value of sequential goods complements or falls relative to previous units.
The deterrence effect, whereby the same bidder pays a high price for the first unit (deterring
58It will only affect the outcome when both the bidder with the highest valuation and the bidder with the
second highest valuation belong to the same ring, but the bidder with the third highest valuation belongs
to a different ring. In this case, our model predicts that the observed price is the valuation of the second
highest bidder, but it actually corresponds to the valuation of the third highest bidder. This is unlikely in
our empirical setting because the nearly 500 farmers would form around 150 rings (based on the geographical
locations that we obtained from the census data). The probability that the two bidders with the highest
valuation belong to the same ring is virtually zero. Moreover, the difference between the second highest and
the third highest valuation will be small in any case.
59There is an extensive literature on the theory of bidding cartels (e.g. Graham and Marshall 1987;
Hendricks, Porter, and Guofu (2008); Hopenhayn and Skrzypacz 2004; and McAfee and McMillan 1992). For
English auctions, Asker 2010 empirically investigates a bidding cartel of collectable stamps. See Harrington
2008 for a survey.
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others from entering subsequent auctions), and a low price for the remaining units, arises
when sunk costs are relatively high compared to the DMR, thus creating complementarities
among the goods. Substitutability arises due to decreasing returns when sunk costs are
relatively small. In this case, equilibrium prices are similar in magnitude, regardless of
whether the same or different bidders win the objects. Careful consideration of these features
is fundamental to demand characterization, a cornerstone of many positive and normative
questions in economics.
Using a novel data set from a decentralized market institution that operated privately for
eight centuries in southern Spain, we document these price dynamics and develop a model
to recover the underlying structural parameters and distribution of valuations. Although
the bidders are better informed than the sellers in our model, the latter know that the se-
quential English auction allocates water (ex-ante) efficiently. Not requiring farmers to reveal
their marginal valuations is an advantage of the mechanism, whose simplicity reduces costs
associated with its implementation and helps explain its stability. We address three main
questions. Are water units complements or substitutes, and why? Is the deterrence effect
consistent with a competitive market structure or a consequence of collusive behavior among
farmers? What would happen to the estimates in this setting if the researcher, by ignoring
the importance of participation and sunk costs, failed to account for the complementarity
feature of the sequential goods?
First we document that during the period under study both complementarities and sub-
stitutabilities are observed in the data, generating different price dynamics. Seasonality,
related to the water requirements of the crops and the expected rainfall, affects the relative
importance of sunk costs and decreasing returns, causing bidders to behave accordingly in
these regimes. Second, the apparent collusive behavior, when the same bidder wins all the
goods, paying very low prices for all the units following the first unit, is actually competitive
(or non-cooperative). Contrary to the collusion hypothesis, this behavior is caused by com-
plementarities, and is observed when the value of water (as well as the average price paid
per unit and, thus, the incentive to deviate from a collusion strategy) increases relative to
the standard competitive pattern registered in the weak substitutes regime. This shows the
importance of interpreting the data through the economic model. Finally, by estimating our
model, we confirm the relevance of participation and sunk costs in our empirical environ-
ment. By testing the performance of our model relative to a standard English auction model
without participation costs, we confirm that estimations using the latter are not accurate.
Aside from the bias generated by ignoring sunk costs and decreasing returns, price dynamics
play an important role, as it is not appropriate to attribute the variation in prices among
sequential units (when the goods are complements) to a relatively more disperse underlying
distribution of valuations.
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Figure 1: Auction Samples.
Panel A: Goods Are Substitutes.
Auction # Name Price Day
1 Pedro Fernández 123
Mo
2 Pedro Fernández 111
3 Pedro Fernández 111
4 Pedro Fernández 109
5 Pedro Blaya 115
Tu
6 Jose Ruiz 116
7 Mauricio Gutiérrez 117
8 Mauricio Gutiérrez 106
9 Ambrosio Ortíz 116
We
10 Ambrosio Ortíz 100
11 Ambrosio Ortíz 100
12 Carlota Pomares 116
13 Eliseo Gutiérrez 120
Th
14 Antonio Muñoz 112
15 Antonio Navarro 110
16 Vicente Ledesma 106
17 Jose Gálvez 103
Fr
18 Juan Martínez 91
19 Juan Martínez 90
20 Jesus Gutiérrez 100
Panel B: Goods are Complements.
Auction # Name Price Day
1 Juana Fernández 1580
Mo
2 Juana Fernández 50
3 Juana Fernández 50
4 Juana Fernández 50
5 Francisco Gabarrón 1401
Tu
6 Francisco Gabarrón 50
7 Francisco Gabarrón 50
8 Francisco Gabarrón 50
9 Jose Fernández 1401
We
10 Jose Fernández 25
11 Jose Fernández 25
12 Jose Fernández 25
13 Antonio Belijar Boluda 1401
Th
14 Antonio Belijar Boluda 25
15 Antonio Belijar Boluda 25
16 Antonio Belijar Boluda 25
17 Manuel Gutiérrez 1406
Fr
18 Manuel Gutiérrez 50
19 Manuel Gutiérrez 50
20 Manuel Gutiérrez 50
Notes: Units 1 to 4 are the units bought on Monday (Mo) during day (unit 1 corresponds to right to irrigate from 7AM to
10AM, unit 2 from 10AM to 1PM, unit 3 from 1PM to 4PM, and unit 4 from 4PM to 7PM). Similarly, units 5 to 8 are the units
bought on Tuesday (Tu) during day; units 9 to 12 are the units on Wednesday (We) during day; units 13 to 16 are the units
on Thursday (Th) during day; and units 17 to 20 are the units on Friday (Fr) during day. Panel A: Sample from original data
obtained from the historical archive: Goods Are Substitutes (Winter - February 18, 1955, Day). Panel B: Sample from original
data obtained from the historical archive: Goods Are Complements (Summer - July 22, 1966, Day).
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Figure 2: Rain and Frequency Distribution of 4CU Over the Sample Period
Notes: The figure displays for each month: i) the number of auctions where the same farmer wins all four consecutive units, and
ii) total rain using a Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression (of ’total rain’ on ’month of the year’) with an Epanechnikov kernel
with bandwidth selected by cross validation.
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Figure 3: Winning Prices: by Number of Consecutive Units Bought by the Same Farmer and
by Unit
Notes: The figure displays price variation from the raw data (for the whole sample) disaggregated by:
i) Top Panel: Number of consecutive units won by the same farmer (1, 2, 3, and 4; note that we called them 1CU, 2CU, 3CU,
and 4CU in Tables A1 in the online and appendix and in table1).
ii) Bottom Panel: further disaggregating each vertical box from the Top Panel by unit (First Unit, Second Unit, Third unit,
and Fourth unit). Note that 1, 2, 3, and 4 indicate the number of consecutive units won by the same farmer (same as in the
graph in the top).
Each vertical box (unit) displays the maximum price (upper adjacent value), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median (black circle
marker), 25th percentile (lower hinge), and minimum price (lower adjacent value).
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Figure 4: Winning Prices: by Weekday, Hour and Schedule
Notes: The figure displays the distribution of winning prices by: i) Unit (First Unit in Blue, Second Unit in Red, Third Unit
in Green, and Fourth Unit in Orange); Weekday (Mo=Monday, Tu=Tuesday, We=Wednesday, Th=Thursday, and Fr=Friday);
and Schedule (Day=Day-Time and Night=Night-Time). Thus, the figure displays the distribution of prices of each of the 40
units auctioned per week for the whole sample (disaggregated by Unit, Weekday, and Schedule). Each vertical box (unit) displays
the maximum price (upper adjacent value), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median (black circle marker), 25th percentile (lower
hinge), and minimum price (lower adjacent value).
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Figure 5: Winning Prices: by Season and Drought
Notes: The figure displays the distribution of winning prices by: i) Season and Drought Indicator. Each vertical box displays
the maximum price (upper adjacent value), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median, 25th percentile (lower hinge), and minimum
price (lower adjacent value). We define a drought as an indicator that equals one when average monthly rain during the specific
year is below a consensus threshold defined in the literature in terms of the historic annual average (following Gil Olcina 1994
we use a threshold of 40%). The numbers below each box correspond to the percentage (in terms of the whole sample) of
observations in each box (i.e. al these numbers sum up to 100%).
Figure 6: The Channel System in Mula and the Sunk Cost of Initiating the Irrigation
Notes: The main canal (left panel) was made of concrete. The individual sub-channels (right panel) were dug into the ground.
Thus, in these sub-channels, a water loss is incurred because water flows over a dry sub-channel (some water is absorbed by the
ground).
44
Figure 7: Auction Sample: Auction where Farmers Are Present and No Bids Are Placed
Auction # Name Price Day
1 Sebastian Aguilar 48
Mo
2 Felipe Amaro 42
3 Felipe Amaro 48
4 Diego Guirao 50
5 Felipe Amaro 54
Tu
6 Antonio Llamas 51
7 Cristóbal Romero 47
8 Cristóbal Romero 50
9 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 2
We
10 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 5
11 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 1
12 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 1
13 Luis Moya 2.75
Th
14 Luis Moya 1
15 Luis Moya 1
16 Luis Moya 1
17
Fr
18
19
20
Notes: Sample from original data obtained from the historical archive: Auction where farmers are present and no bids are placed
(Winter - January 22, 1954, Day).
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Figure 8: Winning and Estimated Prices
Notes: The figure displays real prices against predicted prices using three different models: (i) our structural model (specification
3 in Table 5), (ii) a standard (button) English auction model (specification 5 in Table 5), and (iii) a reduced-form model for the
sample using as regressors: Past Rain, unit (3 dummy variables), weekday (4 dummy variables), schedule (1 dummy variable),
month (11 dummy variables), year (12 dummy variables), and individual fixed effects, in addition to a constant (for details
about the reduced-form specification see Table 2 discussed in subsection 2.4). The graph shows the mean monthly averages of
the prices. Similar results are obtained using a spline (available in our earlier working paper Donna and Espin-Sanchez 2012).
See section D in the online appendix for a high definition version of this figure.
Figure 9: Regime Frequency Disaggregation by Month
Notes: The figure depicts the frequency of auctions where the same farmer buys all four consecutive units (4CU), by regime (see
section 2) and month. (Note that the sum of 4CU over months and regimes—the vertical lines in the graph—is equal to 1470 =
5880/4. See Table 1 in the paper and Table A1 in the online appendix.) It can be seen that complementarities are more likely
to be observed in summer than in winter, where water requirements (and, hence, equilibrium prices) soar. We interpret this as
evidence in favor of the competition hypothesis (according to our model with entry and sunk costs) and against the collusion
hypothesis.
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Table 1: Distribution of Winning Prices: by Number of CU and Sequential Auction
Panel 1: Price distribution by number of consecutive winning bids: All Auctions
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 101 218.2 327.9 3000 0.05 3530
2CU 123 256.7 364.6 2700 0.05 2866
3CU 190 320.0 415.5 4050 0.05 1716
4CU 182 339.9 470.2 4830 0.05 5880
Panel 2: Price distribution by number of consecutive winning bids: First Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 100 211.1 304.1 2921 0.05 977
2CU 150 305.0 427.8 2700 0.05 673
3CU 220.5 410.0 512.5 4050 0.05 382
4CU 451 677.6 689.5 4830 0.05 1470
Panel 3: Price distribution by number of consecutive winning bids: Second Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 93.25 219.8 373.0 3000 0.10 624
2CU 103.5 230.2 328.0 2685 0.05 867
3CU 181 294.9 364.7 2850 0.05 539
4CU 101 242.7 309.3 2605 0.05 1470
Panel 4: Price distribution by number of consecutive winning bids: Third Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 94 200.8 312.3 2357 0.10 715
2CU 126.5 256.5 353.9 2601 0.10 778
3CU 151.5 285.55 379.0 2801 0.05 536
4CU 100 229.2 294.2 2701 0.05 1470
Panel 5: Price distribution by number of consecutive winning bids: Fourth Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 114.5 233.4 330.2 2601 0.05 1214
2CU 113.5 239.6 344.8 2601 0.10 548
3CU 167 311.6 411.6 2630 0.05 259
4CU 100 210.1 272.6 2935 0.05 1470
Panel 6: Price distribution for 4CU
Auction Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1st to 4th 182 339.9 470.2 4830 0.05 5880
1st 451 677.6 689.5 4830 0.05 1470
2nd 101 242.7 309.3 2605 0.05 1470
3rd 100 229.2 294.2 2701 0.05 1470
4th 100 210.1 272.6 2935 0.05 1470
1st and 2nd 253 460.2 576.9 4830 0.05 2940
2nd and 3rd 101.0 235.9 301.9 3001 0.05 2940
3rd and 4th 100.0 219.7 283.7 2935 0.05 2940
1st to 3rd 200.0 383.2 512.4 4830 0.05 4410
2nd to 4th 100.0 227.3 292.7 3001 0.05 4410
Notes: The table displays the Distribution of Winning Prices. Panels 1 to 5 presents the Distribution of Prices disaggregated
by cases where the same farmer buys one, two, three, or four consecutive units (1CU, 2CU, 3CU, or 4CU, respectively). Panel
1 presents the Distribution of Prices for All Auctions (i.e. First, Second, Third, and Fourth Auctions). Panel 2 presents the
Distribution of Prices for First Auctions. Panel 3 presents the Distribution of Prices for Second Auctions. Panel 4 presents
the Distribution of Prices for Third Auctions. Panel 5 presents the Distribution of Prices for Fourth Auctions. Finally, Panel
6 presents Distribution of Prices just for 4CU (i.e. for the subsample of 5880 auctions where the same farmer won all four
consecutive units). Note that the first line in Panel 6 (1st to 4th) displays the same information as the last line in Panel 1
(4CU). The second line in Panel 6 (1st) displays the same information as the last line in Panel 2 (4CU). The third line in Panel
6 (2nd) displays the same information as the last line in Panel 3 (4CU). The fourth line in Panel 6 (3rd) displays the same
information as the last line in Panel 4 (4CU). The fifth line in Panel 6 (4th) displays the same information as the last line in
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Table 2: Correlation Between Winning Prices and Covariates
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain MA7 -4.0543*** -4.1117*** -2.9911*** -3.1741***
(0.6742) (0.6894) (0.5580) (0.6227)
Rain Day Bought -0.2346 -0.1853 0.0519 0.1779
(0.1434) (0.1416) (0.1558) (0.1531)
Unit 2 Day -167.95*** -167.82*** -180.61***
(19.47) (19.45) (21.89)
Unit 3 Day -173.03*** -172.91*** -188.05***
(19.93) (19.92) (22.75)
Unit 4 Day -176.54*** -176.54*** -190.83***
(20.44) (20.44) (23.10)
Unit 2 Night -237.58*** -237.86*** -249.33***
(24.90) (24.94) (27.35)
Unit 3 Night -243.32*** -243.52*** -257.65***
(25.45) (25.49) (28.31)
Unit 4 Night -254.84*** -255.19*** -266.41***
(25.73) (25.78) (28.91)
Tuesday 26.02*** 32.19*** 10.06
(7.49) (8.24) (12.48)
Wednesday -34.58*** -29.39** -31.73**
(10.63) (11.97) (15.47)
Thursday -59.65*** -55.41*** -42.92***
(10.77) (12.35) (15.04)
Friday -94.95*** -95.54*** -76.37***
(12.71) (14.50) (17.29)
Night -110.09*** -111.04*** -102.68***
(11.36) (10.95) (13.43)
Unit FE No Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE No Yes Yes Yes
Schedule FE No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No Yes Yes
Individual FE No No No Yes
R2 0.016 0.083 0.230 0.359
Observations 13,801 13,801 13,801 13,801
Notes: All columns are OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the winning price in each auction (one cuarta). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. FE stands for Fixed Effects. Individual FE refers to a set of dummy variables identifying different winners
(names) in our sample. We obtain similar results including Week FE (a set of dummy variables identifying 52 or 53 weeks of
the corresponding year). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample restricted to auctions with positive bids during the period
January 1954 to August 1966.
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Table 3: Timing Structure of Different Winners: Estimation Sample
Month 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Total
1 4 6 0 3 1 11 3 0 0 0 28 0 11 61
2 4 4 0 2 4 2 3 0 0 0 19 0 21 57
3 5 3 0 9 0 1 2 0 0 10 29 8 23 79
4 0 2 0 6 2 5 4 6 0 17 28 38 28 121
5 5 7 0 6 1 13 9 6 9 4 32 30 31 130
6 3 7 0 7 0 8 10 7 10 14 23 25 29 119
7 2 3 0 6 9 26 8 5 13 15 17 21 23 117
8 9 3 0 3 4 10 7 14 18 15 21 16 3 102
9 8 8 0 3 8 10 5 13 0 8 35 19 0 97
10 8 7 3 2 11 2 0 9 0 10 16 19 0 78
11 7 2 3 0 8 2 0 4 0 21 29 23 0 82
12 1 0 2 2 3 1 0 0 0 36 18 12 0 69
Total 48 43 8 43 48 80 47 54 44 106 179 147 128 537
Notes: Total, in the last row, refers to the total number of different winners for the specific year (column). Given that, within
a year, the same bidders win multiple units in several months, this number is below the sum over months, by year. Similarly for
the last column, where Total is the number of different bidders for the specific month (row) during the 13-year sample. Finally,
537, refers to the total number of different bidders in the whole sample. The monthly average of different bidders who bought
water in the sample (years 1954 to 1966) is 8.31.
Table 4: Rain Expectations and Regime Coordination
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Future Rain -0.0016*** -0.0015*** -0.0016***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Weekday FE NO YES YES
Schedule FE NO YES YES
Month FE NO NO YES
Notes: Sample restricted to the one used in the structural estimation in Table 5. Almost identical results are obtained using the
whole sample. All specifications are probit regressions. Marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the regime is strict complements. Future Rain is a moving average
of rain in Mula for seven days after the corresponding date of the auction (Future Rain is a proxy variable for farmers’ rain
expectations for the day where they are buying water). Past Rain (a moving average of rain in Mula for seven days before the
corresponding date of the auction) and Actual Rain (the amount of rain in Mula in the day of the auction) are not statistically
significant in any of the above regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Structural Estimation
Structural parameters
Specifications
Sequential Auction Model Standard Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Valuation [ ˆE(V )]
150.3432 130.0122 155.7818 135.2014 166.9905 142.8629
(12.8135) (11.0474) (17.6083) (14.6744) (87.4399) (81.0892)
Sunk Cost (αˆ)
0.0303 0.03013 0.0305 0.0321
(6.9e-03) (7.6e-04) (2.1e-03) (4.9e-03)
βˆc
0
0.0103 0.0101 0.0101 0.0102
(2.6e-05) (7.3e-05) (5.0e-03) (7.4e-04)
βˆs
0
0.0100 0.0102 0.0103 0.0149
(0.0036) (0.0019) (4.3e-03) (1.5e-03)
Future Rain
βˆc
1
-2.41e-14 -2.23e-17 -1.73e-12 1.82e-14
(7.1e-02) (3.4e-03) (8.0e-10) (3.29e-10)
βˆs
1
0.2130 0.18278 0.21279 0.18282
(0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0170) (0.0786)
Mean ρˆ
- Strict Complements 0.2387 0.2052 0.2366 0.2193
- Weak Substitutes -0.3321 -0.2855 -0.3221 -0.2857
N 8 10 8 10 8 10
Past Rain Polynomial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schedule Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday Dummy Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummy Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.3240 0.3157 0.5757 0.5708 0.1417 0.1334
Log likelihood -12,206 -13,068 -10,755 -11,298 -50,931 -54,957
# of Auctions 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors (with B = 1, 000 bootstrap repetitions) are reported in parenthesis (for the Mean Valuation
it corresponds to the bootstrapped standard error corresponding to Z0
t
γ). Estimates in columns 1 to 4 (sequential auction model)
are obtained using the estimation procedure described in subsection 4.1 (see sections E and F in the online appendix for details).
For the distribution of private values and inclusion of covariates, we use an exponential distribution. Estimates in specifications
5 and 6 (standard model) are MLE obtained by maximizing the likelihood function from a standard English auction model
allowing the mean of the distribution of valuations depend on the same characteristics as in the other specifications as indicated
in equation 7, without fixed costs nor decreasing marginal returns (the sample is the same as the one in columns 1 to 4, including
in this case all sequential prices in the estimation). Number of years in the sample is 13. Number of months in the sample is
119. The number of different winners (across all 13 years) is 537. The complementarity parameter, ρ, is computed as detailed
in the in section 3. When the goods are strict complements is given by ρC
t
=
α 3βCt
1 α
=
α 3(βC
0
+βC
1
R
F
t )
1 α
. The table reports, for
each specification of the sequential auction model in columns 1 to 4: ˆ¯ρC =
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⇣
βˆC
0
+βˆC
1
1
T (
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. Similarly, when the
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⌘
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Table 6: Structural Estimation (continued)
Structural parameters
Specifications
Sequential Auction Model Standard Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covariates
Past Rain (γˆ1)
-1.6146 -1.4154 -1.4263 -1.2268
(0.2378) (0.6048) (0.4362) (0.3344)
(Past Rain)2 (γˆ2)
0.0067 0.0059 0.0035 0.0030
(0.0175) (0.0408) (0.1769) (0.3531)
Night (γˆ3)
-24.8354 -22.3776 -30.0143 -26.1154
(6.7191) (8.7932) (2.1919) (4.9555)
Tuesday (γˆ4)
-1.4161 -1.0701 -2.6421 -2.5392
(0.5736) (7.6148) (1.5188) (1.9088)
Wednesday (γˆ5)
-2.2278 -1.8666 -5.8581 -5.2031
(0.2821) (0.7075) (2.4308) (8.2804)
Thursday (γˆ6)
-12.2254 -10.4366 -15.6447 -13.5841
(0.6234) (0.7104) (5.3297) (6.7553)
Friday (γˆ7)
-18.5621 -15.6785 -28.0254 -24.4607
(7.6097) (7.7227) (11.273) (1.9786)
Feb. (γˆ8)
-11.3043 -10.8456 -4.9546 -4.5866
(31.0356) (25.2992) (2.5292) (4.8506)
Mar. (γˆ9)
25.7168 22.3280 34.9764 30.3576
(12.4594) (8.8090) (9.8466) (7.2566)
Apr. (γˆ8)
74.3364 64.4103 79.0141 67.4984
(20.3764) (13.8432) (21.2338) (30.6913)
May. (γˆ10)
122.7401 106.5709 114.3906 96.8053
(20.8348) (41.6119) (46.6579) (26.4896)
Jun. (γˆ11)
59.1822 51.3507 57.5386 48.6186
(16.4161) (10.3025) (7.2765) (13.7110)
Jul. (γˆ12)
205.0336 178.1870 225.1911 191.9603
(48.9032) (17.2052) (39.4104) (32.0874)
Aug. (γˆ13)
234.08 202.33 247.37 209.960
(25.0066) (36.6522) (74.3932) (76.8297)
Sep. (γˆ14)
77.8438 62.1518 87.9861 75.4594
(30.3519) (27.7681) (39.7660) (16.5192)
Oct. (γˆ15)
78.0094 66.7736 80.6362 70.4396
(28.3337) (30.9348) (30.9033) (26.2828)
Nov. (γˆ16)
6.1147 4.9367 13.0491 11.0444
(2.4101) (1.1223) (4.6046) (6.8271)
Dec. (γˆ17)
1.8545 1.4035 2.8171 2.4928
(1.7341) (2.5649) (2.2955) (2.6782)
Intercept (γˆ0)
150.3432 130.0122 90.9944 79.9478 101.7712 87.8253
(12.8135) (11.0474) (23.7572) (31.5409) (54.6088) (82.3199)
N 8 10 8 10 8 10
Past Rain Polynomial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schedule Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday Dummy Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummy Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.3240 0.3157 0.5757 0.5708 0.1417 0.1334
Log likelihood -12,206 -13,068 -10,755 -11,298 -50,931 -54,957
# of Auctions 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952
Notes: See notes in Table 5.
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Table 7: Counterfactuals
Panel A: Efficiency gains/losses per unit relative to the benchmark
Myopic Large Paved
Farmers Units Channels
(1) (2) (3)
Sunk Costs -28.56 0.20 12.91
(14.97) (1.37) (6.82)
[-60.63, -0.06] [0,15.49] [0.02,39.97]
Deacreasing 27.31 -3.27 0
Marginal Returns (27.71) (33.99) -
[0.05,479.22] [-615.29,0] -
Total -1.25 -3.06 12.91
(35.72) (24.12) (6.82)
[-60.63,479.22] [-615.29, 15.49] [0,39.97]
Panel B: Total efficiency gains/losses relative to the benchmark
Myopic Large Paved
Farmers Units Channels
(1) (2) (3)
Sunk Costs -42,497.36 303.94 19,208.09
Deacreasing 40,651.43 -4867.68 0
Marginal Returns
Total -1,846.59 -4,563.74 19,208.09
Notes: The table displays the welfare measures computed in the three counterfactual scenarios described in subsection 5.2. All
numbers are in pesetas, and report comparisons of the welfare relative to the benchmark case in specification 3 from Tables
5 and 6 (i.e. the benchmark case has: non-myopic farmers, single units with right to use 3 hours of water for irrigation, and
non-paved channels). Positive numbers indicate efficiency gains relative to the benchmark; negative numbers indicate efficiency
losses relative to the benchmark. Panel A displays the efficiency gain/loss per unit (mean across units and farmers). Standard
deviation is reported in parenthesis. The largest and smallest values are reported in squared brackets. Panel B displays the
total efficiency gain/loss in each counterfactual scenario. The total efficiency measure is the sum (across all units and farmers)
gain/loss per unit during the 13 years sample period in our data. In both panels, for each set of welfare measures, we report the
efficiency gains/losses due to sunk cost, decreasing marginal returns, and the total change. The latter is defined as the sum of
the efficiency gains/losses due to sunk cost plus decreasing marginal returns.
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